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1. INTRODUCTION
The ideal of a new international economic order, as a more
favorable framework for the development of third world nations, is
closely intertwined with the quest for industrialization. As Raymond
Vernon suggested some years ago, given the heterogeneity among devel-
oping countries, what binds them together is what they are not, and
they are not industrialized.1 While the lack of industrialization is char-
* This article is based on the author's LL.M. paper, which in 1988 was awarded
the Laylin Prize for the best essay written by a Harvard Law School student in the
area of public international law. A book based on the paper is to be published, in
Spanish, by the Universidad del Pacifico Press, Lima, Peru.
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The author wishes to thank Vice Dean David N. Smith of Harvard Law School
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1 See R. VERNON, STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS 139 (1977).
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acteristic of third world countries, industrialization is a common objec-
tive among them. During the last two decades they have implemented
two broad models of industrial development, known as import-substitu-
tion and export-oriented strategies.2 Although very few developing na-
tions have adopted either one of these models exclusively, most have
opted to encourage one or the other.
There are several instruments of industrial policy that developing
countries may utilize when implementing an industrialization strategy.
Ordinarily, policy instruments are selected depending on whether the
country intends to foster an export-oriented or an import-substitution
strategy. There are, nevertheless, a number of policy instruments
which, if adequately structured, are flexible enough to fit well into ei-
ther scheme. Among the latter type of "neutral" industrial policy in-
struments, Free Industrial Zones (FIZs), a concept usually identified
with export-orientated strategies, is one of the most common, as well as
one of the most debated.
A study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) defines an FIZ as an administratively and some-
times geographically designated area enjoying special status allowing
for the free import of equipment and other materials to be used in the
manufacture of goods earmarked for export; the special status generally
involves favorable legal provisions and regulations creating incentives
for foreign investments.' By 1988, there were some 107 FIZs operating
in fifty-one developing countries.4 Since 1962, when the first FIZ was
established in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, the expansion of FIZs in the
third world has continued at a remarkable rate. This rapid expansion
is probably related to early support from U.N. organs5 and to a wide-
spread belief in the certain success of FIZs in attracting foreign invest-
ment, contributing to an export drive, and stimulating employment.
2 Import-substitution generally consists of the protection of local industries sup-
plying the local market with manufactured goods which in the past were imported.
Export-oriented strategies focus on the promotion of industries that orient a substantial
part of their production to foreign markets.
I A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, INVESTING IN FREE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES
20 (1984).
" Worldwide figures offered by Dorothy and Walter Diamond are even more im-
pressive, reporting some 518 free trade zones in 86 countries. However, these include
free ports and zones not intended for manufacturing and FIZs located in industrial
nations. See D. DIAMOND & W. DIAMOND, 1 TAx-FREE TRADE ZONES Or THE
WORLD xvii (1989).
1 See, e.g., U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEv., THE USE OF FREE ZONES AS A
MEANS FOR EXPANDING AND DIVERSIFYING EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES FROM
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/125, (1973); U.N. INDUS. DEv.
ORG., HANDBOOK FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FREE EXPORTS PROCESSING ZONES
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. UNIDO/IOD.31 (1976).
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This article presents a legal and developmental approach to the
FIZ concept as it has been adopted by developing nations. An inquiry
into its historical and economic foundations, and a reconsideration of its
performance in the third world, indicates that certain law and policy
measures might contribute to the adaptation of FIZs to the develop-
mental goals of third world countries. The present study intends to
demonstrate that although FIZs are far from being a panacea, they are
neutral and flexible instruments of industrial policy. The article also
intends to show that FIZs, when designed in accordance with the needs
and potentials of a given country, have proven to be valuable means for
achieving developmental goals usually attributed to industrialization.
Moreover, the study seeks to emphasize that legal analysis may be very
worthwhile when structuring, implementing or evaluating FIZs in de-
veloping countries.'
The legal and developmental perspective of this study may well be
summarized in a single question: How can law contribute to the
achievement of developmental goals? Applying such an approach to the
study of FIZs, the question becomes: What can legal concepts, institu-
tions and processes do to make the implementation of FIZs more con-
sistent with the developmental goals that third world countries attribute
to them? Accordingly, this study begins with a general evaluation of
FIZs, then moves to concrete legal and policy recommendations aimed
at making their operation more consistent with the developmental
objectives of third world nations. For such purposes, the article relies
on previous analyses, field studies, information, and data available in
both legal and non-legal literature on the subject.7 As a consequence of
the present developmental perspective, a considerable part of this study
is devoted to non-legal issues, in an effort to build a more realistic
' In a 1974 report to the Agency for International Development (AID), David
Smith and Robert Meagher wrote that an understanding of the role of law in society is
of fundamental importance in undertaking development studies, as the implementation
of development policies is effected through law and the legal processes of society. See R.
Meagher & D. Smith, Law and the Development Practitioner, Final Report to the
Agency for International Development on Contract No. AID/CSD-3977 (December
31, 1974) (unpublished manuscript).
I There is no one comprehensive legal essay on FIZs in developing countries. The
sole studies written from a legal viewpoint are a short article by Jayawardena, Free
Trade Zones, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 427 (1983); and a recent note on Latin Ameri-
can FIZs: Note, Foreign Trade Zones in Latin America: A Spectrum of Possible Uses,
23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 117 (1988). There are also three case studies on the Panamanian,
Mexican and Chinese FIZs. See S. Salcedo, An Evaluation of the Panamanian Free
Trade Zone (May 6, 1988) (LL.M. thesis, available at Harvard Law School Library);
Bettwy, Mexico's Development: Foreign Trade Zones and Direct Foreign Investment,
22 COMp. JuRiD. REV. 49 (1985); Klitgaard, Preferential Treatment for Foreign In-
vestment in the People's Republic of China: Special Economic Zones and Industrial
Development Districts, 7 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 377 (1984).
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framework for the theory and praxis of FIZs and to address certain
developmental policy considerations about which all social scientists, le-
gal scholars among them, must have something to say.
It is important to emphasize that this study was not created under
the influence of the school of legal thinking known as "law and devel-
opment," in vogue in the United States during the late 1960s and the
early 1970s.8 However, the article shares the general pattern of ap-
proaching developmental issues from a legal point of view, and al-
though it would probably fit well among "those works [that] are sub-
stance-specific, dealing with particular aspects of [the] law in relation
to particular development objectives,"' it does not espouse any general
theory on law and development.
2. FREE INDUSTRIAL ZONES IN THE QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT
2.1 General Aspects of FIZs
2.1.1 Historical Background
FIZs are a modern adaptation, for industrial purposes, of Free
Trade Zones, and have been modeled after the age-old concept of Free
Ports (FPs). An FP is "an area generally encompassing an entire port
and its surrounding locality, into which goods of foreign origin may be
brought without the imposition of customs duties[,] or subject only to a
minim[um] . . . tariff, whether such goods are intended for re[-]export
or for local consumption."' The origins of the FP have been traced to
the time of the Phoenician merchants, when attacks and arbitrary taxa-
tion forced traders to seek protection in Mediterranean ports such as
Tyre, Carthage, and Utica, which offered safe passage of goods."1 A
similar system was adopted by the Greek city-states in Challis and
Piraeus, where special stockades were implemented.12
The oldest known FP established expressly to promote trade was
the Roman customs-free port on the Aegean island of Delos. 3 In 1189,
8 For a discussion on the apogee and crisis of the law and development school in
the United States, see Trubek & Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Re-
flections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974
Wis. L. REv. 1062 and Burg, Law and Development: A Review of the Literature & A
Critique of "Scholars in Self-Estrangement," 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 492 (1977).
Burg, supra note 8, at 494.
10 H. GRAYSON, FREE TRADE ZONES AND RELATED FACILITIES ABROAD 6
(U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1970).
21 See D. DIAMOND & W. DIAMOND, supra note 4, at xvi. See also R. THOMAN,
FREE PORTS AND FOREIGN TRADE ZONES 11-12 (1956).
11 See Jayawardena, supra note 7, at 427.
1 Id.
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Frederic I established one of the earliest significant FPs when he ex-
cused the city of Hamburg from payment of customs duties." FPs were
also established in harbors located along international trade routes such
as Gibraltar (1704), Singapore (1819), and Hong Kong (1848). In
1888, Hamburg became the first port to be granted the special privilege
of manufacturing, on the conditions that it not compete with the hinter-
land and remain export-oriented.15
The modern concept of free trade "zone," as opposed to free
"cport" or free "city," was introduced by the United States in the For-
eign Trade Zones Act of 1934." The New York Foreign Trade Zone
No. 1 was established in 1937 as the first FTZ in the world.' The
importance of U.S. FTZs remained rather small until a 1950 act au-
thorized export-oriented processing within the foreign trade zones,'
creating for the first time an FTZ where manufacturing was permitted.
A further development was accomplished in 1959 with the found-
ing of the Shannon FTZ in Ireland. The Shannon FTZ was the first
Free Industrial Zone (FIZ) created expressly for customs-free export-
oriented manufacturing. The FIZ model developed at Shannon was a
combination of the FTZ concept with the emerging concept of indus-
trial estates, i.e., "a tract of land which is subdivided and developed
according to a comprehensive plan for the use of a community of indus-
trial enterprises."' 9 The Shannon zone also merged the advantages of
both concepts, offering "full infrastructural facilities, including . . .
rental of suitable factory accommodations, and permitting duty free ac-
cess of raw materials, components and capital equipment and similar
" See Note, Foreign Trade Zones: "Everything Except the Customs?," 31 U.
FLA. L. REV. 725, 727 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Foreign Trade Zones].
' Jayawardena, supra note 7, at 427.
IS Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-397, 48 Stat. 998 (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 81a-81u (1982)). A Free or Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ)
was described by Congressman Emanuel Cellar, principal promoter of the Act, as "an
isolated, enclosed and policed area in or adjacent to a port of entry, furnished with the
necessary facilities for lading or unlading, for supplying fuel and ship stores for storing
goods and for reshipping them by land and water-an area within which goods may be
landed, stored, mixed, blended, repacked, manufactured, and reshipped without pay-
ment of duties and without the intervention of customs officials." Bader, Jurisdictional
Uncertainty: The American Foreign Trade Zone, 8 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
239, 240 (1983) (citing 78 Cong. Rec. 9853 (1934)).
17 See R. THOMAN, FREE PORTS AND FOREIGN TRADE ZONES 140 (1956), cited
in Note, Foreign Trade Zones, supra note 14, at 732 n.55.
11 See generally deKieffer & Thompson, Political and Policy Dimensions of For-
eign Trade Zones: Expansion or the Beginning of the End?, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 481, 483-91 (1985).
'" See W. BREDO, INDUSTRIAL ESTATES: TOOL FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION 1
(1960).
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facilities for exports.""
The Shannon FIZ model was immediately followed by developing
countries such as Puerto Rico (Mayaguez, 1962) and India (Kandla,
1965)." Zones were established subsequently in Taiwan (Kaohsiung),
the Philippines (Bataan), the Dominican Republic (La Romana),
Mexico (Baja California), Panama (Colon) and Brazil (Manaos). Be-
tween 1971 and 1975, twenty-three new FIZs were created in ten de-
veloping countries, and from 1976 to 1978 another twenty-one zones
were set up in fourteen countries.22 By 1984, there were some seventy-
nine zones operating in third world countries, and dozens were under
development.2" As stated above, 1988 figures indicate that there are ap-
proximately 107 FIZs operating in fifty-one developing countries
today.24
2.1.2 The Concept of FIZs
The ancient institutions of Free Ports and free cities originated the
concept of customs-free enclaves, the oldest forerunners of the modern
FIZ. A more sophisticated development was the concept of the FTZ,
conceived as a bounded area (not necessarily a port or a city) that
through a legal fiction is considered to be outside the customs territory
of the country where the FTZ lies. FTZs are still used for commercial
activities such as storage, exhibition, blending, and packing of goods "in
transit" and to facilitate their sale, distribution, or onward shipping
without changing the customs tariff classification.2" Through the years,
manufacturing has been permitted in certain free zones. The modern
concept of FIZs was finally defined when this model of manufacturing
FTZs merged with the industrial-estate technique of providing a com-
mon infrastructure and facilities to attract domestic and foreign inves-
tors.2 6 Thus, FIZs are basically customs-free industrial estates.
20 J. CURRIE, EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES IN THE 1980s: CUSTOMS FREE MAN-
UFACTURING 1 (1985) [hereinafter J. CURRIE, EPZs IN THE 1980S].
21 A few years later, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission en-
couraged the establishment of FIZs as an avenue for export expansion and diversifica-
tion. See sources cited supra note 5.
22 J. CURRIE, INVESTMENT: THE GROWING ROLE OF EXPORT PROCESSING
ZONES 7 (1979) [hereinafter J. CURRIE, THE GROWING ROLE OF EPZs].
23 J. CURRIE, EPZs IN THE 1980s, supra note 20, at 3.
24 See supra note 4. For an updated list of FIZs in developing countries, see the
Appendix to this essay.
25 H. GRAYSON, supra note 10, at 5.
2' A study by UNIDO includes Asian FIZs among the most successful industrial
estates in developing countries. See U.N. INDUS. DEv. ORG., GUIDELINES FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ESTATES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 93-94, U.N.
Doc. ID/220, U.N. Sales No. E.78.II.B13 (1978).
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Two significant developments in this concept occurred during the
late 1960s, when third world countries began to establish FIZs as tools
for industrial development. First, in addition to the infrastructure and
facilities inherent in the Shannon model and the well-known compara-
tive wage advantages of developing countries, new incentives were cre-
ated to attract foreign investors. Artificial stimuli such as tax exemp-
tions, financial assistance, and subsidies were offered to create a
paradise for transnational capital and to compete successfully in the
world arena of investment opportunities. " The second relevant devel-
opment in the concept of FIZs is in fact a consequence of new trends in
international trade and recent shifts in the international division of la-
bor. FIZs in developing countries became export processing zones with
very limited linkages with the host economy, since most of the inputs
were foreign raw materials and intermediate products, and most of the
production was destined for foreign markets."8
In summary, an FIZ is a designated area, frequently near a port
or an airport, which has a basic infrastructure of common facilities and
services, is considered for customs purposes as outside the territory of
the host nation, and where an incentive package is offered to potential
investors for the establishment of manufacturing plants primarily ori-
ented toward foreign markets.
2.1.3 A Flexible Instrument of Industrial Policy
Despite the reported success of FIZs in the quest for industrializa-
tion and their relevant role in the economic growth of newly industrial-
izing nations, it is important to bear in mind that the zones are not by
themselves a developmental strategy. An FIZ is just an instrument of
industrial policy whose success depends on careful design and imple-
mentation within the broader framework of a coherent strategy of eco-
nomic development. Among the main features that make the zone con-
cept attractive for third world countries are its exceptional flexibility in
adapting to any developmental strategy and its reported capacity to ac-
complish, although on a small scale, certain development objectives
commonly ascribed to industrialization.
FIZs are frequently considered to be vehicles for implementing ex-
Doc. ID/220, U.N. Sales No. E.78.II.B13 (1978).
27 The down side of such an innovation, that is, the increasing competition among
developing nations operating FIZs, will be extensively discussed below.
"' In fact, the term "Export Processing Zones" most frequently designates the
concept of FIZs. However, "Free Industrial Zones" is also used in several previous
works, and it has been preferred because it more properly conveys the industrialization
objectives attributed to the zones.
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port-oriented industrialization strategies.2" In fact, most of the zones in
developing countries are expressly created to be export-led, "reserved
for the production of goods for the world market."30 The adaptability
of FIZs to outward-oriented schemes is quite natural: as lower costs of
production are characteristic of these areas, products manufactured in
the zones may successfully compete in the international market. FIZs,
however, may also fit well within an industrialization strategy based on
import-substitution. As the zones are usually a system of exceptions, a
correlation might be established between them and tariff protection for
domestic industries, so that export-oriented manufacturers would enjoy
the benefits of an incentive package including duty-free imports. As Ba-
sile and Germidis remark, "This is of course quite natural, as in a
completely liberal system the FEPZ [free export processing zone] has
no raison d'gtre.
''31
Export-orientation of the zones is not an invariable rule. Currie
reported in 1979 that occasionally zones may be import- rather than
export-oriented, citing the case of Colombia. 2 About eighty-five per-
cent of the goods produced in Colombian FIZs are sold in the domestic
market.3 Backward linkages with the local economy in Colombian
zones are quite developed, with a domestic value added exceeding fifty-
one percent in 1979.34 Nonetheless, the new Free Trade Zones Act of
Colombia, passed in late 1985, established explicitly that the objective
of FIZs is "to promote and develop the process of industrialization of
goods destined primarily for foreign markets."3
The versatility of FIZs as an industrial policy tool is also to be
noted in the emergence of relatively new forms of zones, such as the
concept of special sub-zones. The sub-zones are tailor-made regimes
"for companies wishing to utilize the zone concept but unable to relo-
cate to an existing zone."38 The major distinction between a FIZ and a
29 Neil Dias Karunaratne characterizes FIZs as "the main vehicle for implement-
ing the export-oriented industrialization strategy." Karunaratne, Export Oriented In-
dustrialization Strategies, 1980 INTERECONOMIcS 217, 220.
"0 Fernandez Kelly, Contemporary Production and the New International Divi-
sion of Labor, in THE AMERICAS IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR
206, 222 n.2, (S. Sanderson ed. 1985).
a A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 21.
J2 j. CURRIE, THE GROWING ROLE OF EPZs, supra note 22, at 20.
32 Ibarra, Por Favor No Hagamos Experimentos Costosos, 18 REVISTA ANTIO-
QUENA DE ECONOMIA Y DESARROLLO 60 (1984).
"4 Giraldo, Prada & Turriago, Las Zonas Francas en Colombia: Evoluci6n,
Situacibn Actual y Perspectivas, REVISTA DE PLANEACION Y DESARROLLO, Sept.-Oct.
1980, at 17.
" Law No. 109 of 1985, art. 6, Legislacion de las Zonas Francas, COLOMBIA
EXPORTA, July-Aug. 1986, at 5-11 (in English) [hereinafter COLUMBIA-EXPORTA].
3' Bader, supra note 17, at 241.
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sub-zone is that the latter is accessible for use by only one firm, which
simply designates the part of its facilities which will comprise the sub-
zone.87 Although the sub-zone concept was initially developed in the
United States,"8 today there are several sub-zone systems in developing
nations, such as the Licensed Manufacturing Warehouse Programme
in Malaysia, 9 the Vallejo Plan in Colombia,'0 and the Maquiladoras
Program in Mexico.'
2.2 Economic Foundations of FIZs
An analysis of economic concepts and issues related to interna-
tional relations provides a four-part explanation of the origin, expan-
sion, and current trends of FIZs in developing countries: (1) theories of
comparative advantage underline the relevance of the countries' endow-
ments to their specialization in production and commerce; (2) a phe-
nomenon known as vertical integration explains the emergence of a
new international division of labor in manufacture; (3) several factors
have determined a massive shift from import-substitution to export-ori-
ented industrialization strategies; and (4) the world debt crisis generates
balance-of-payments constraints in developing economies. An analysis
of the importance of these economic foundations for the evolution of
FIZs in third world countries follows.
2.2.1 Comparative Advantage and the Product Life Cycle
In the early nineteenth century, David Ricardo demonstrated the
mutual benefits from bilateral trade between countries when each of
them specializes in exporting those goods in the production of which it
has a comparative advantage.4 According to the law of comparative
advantage, a country trading with another country must export those
goods in which, comparatively, it has the lowest production costs and
7 Id.
S See generally Atkins, Doyle & Schwidetzky, Foreign-Trade Zones: Sub-Zones,
State Taxation and State Legislation, 8 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 445, 448 (1979)
(discussing the United States sub-zone concept).
" See ECON. & Soc. COMM'N FOR ASIA & THE PACIFIc/U.N. CENTRE FOR
TRANSNAT'L CORP. JOINT UNIT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, AN EVALUA-
TION OF EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES IN SELECTED ASIAN CouNTRIES, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESCAP/395, 146 (1985) [hereinafter ESCAP/UNCTC JOINT UNrr ON TRANS-
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS].
'0 See Gonzales, El Sitio Adecuado para las Zonas Francas: Una Cuestion de
Alternativas, 18 REViSTA ANTIOQUENA DE ECONOMIA Y DESARROLLO 146 (1984).
41 See Bettwy, supra note 7, at 61 & n.47 (discussing the Maquiladoras
Program).
"" The theory of comparative advantage was explained in the famous book, D.
RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1911).
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must import those goods in which, comparatively, it has a disadvantage.
Benefits for both economies are derived from such an exchange.' De-
veloping countries following Ricardo's theory would specialize in pro-
ducing those goods containing a high proportion of domestically availa-
ble natural resources.4 In other words, the natural endowment of a
country determines its specialization in production and trade.
More than a century after Ricardo, the Swedish economist Bertil
Ohlin, following some insights of his teacher Eli Heckscher, developed
the so-called factor-allocation theorem."5 According to this theorem,
countries will have a comparative advantage in exporting those goods
that use their more abundant factors of production-labor, capital,
etc.-more intensively. 46 The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem clarified why
developing countries will concentrate in producing and exporting labor-
intensive goods, whereas industrialized countries will produce capital-
intensive goods. Hence, the factor endowment of a country also deter-
mines its specialization in production and commerce.
Both the Ricardian and the Heckscher-Ohlin models rely on an
assumption of purely competitive product and factor markets. But there
are further theoretical developments that include in their analyses dy-
namic factors, such as international capital investments and technology
diffusion. In particular, new theories demonstrate that research endow-
ments-i.e., skilled labor, research and development (R&D) expendi-
tures, etc.-do contribute to trade promotion and country specializa-
tion4 7 The most celebrated of these theories was developed by
Raymond Vernon and is known as the product life-cycle model. 4'
According to Vernon, products have a life cycle that can be divided
into a series of phases. In the "early" phase, a new skill-intensive prod-
uct is introduced to the home market and subsequently exported to
high-income countries. In the "growth" phase, foreign markets are be-
coming more familiar with the product, and local demand for domestic
production is satisfied by licensing or establishing subsidiaries. Finally,
3 See J. BARTON & B. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT:
REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss 5-7 (1986).
41 See Hirsch, Hypotheses Regarding Trade between Developing and Industrial
Countries, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR: PROBLEMS AND PERSPEC-
TIVES 65, 66 (H. Giersch ed. 1974).
45 Paul Samuelson finally spelled out the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, based on E.
HECKSCHER, THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN TRADE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
(1919) and on B. OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1933).
46 See P. LINDERT & C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 31
(1982).
47 See G. MEIER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THE THEORY OF POLICY 36-37
(1980).
48 The first explanation of this theory may be found in Vernon, International
Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle, 80 Q.J. ECON. 190 (1966).
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in the "mature" phase, the innovative advantage of the home country is
lost, while overseas producers in low-income countries gain a compara-
tive advantage in production costs and begin to export the product to
third markets and even to the product's home country.4
As with the natural endowment and factor allocation of the coun-
try, research endowment will also determine a specialization in exports
of manufactures, following the product life cycle. Developing countries
will produce and export "mature" products, while industrialized coun-
tries will typically manufacture products in their earlier phases. The
aforementioned theories imply that developing countries should special-
ize in manufacturing and trading those goods that more efficently util-
ize their own endowments. This suggests that countries may benefit
from adopting industrial and commercial policies, such as establishing
FIZs, which are oriented toward fully exploiting their comparative
advantages.
2.2.2 Vertical Integration and the New International Division of
Labor
Since Adam Smith, the theory of division of labor has postulated
that if a person has a relative advantage in some activity, there is an
efficiency gain, both for him and for the whole society, to be derived
from his specializing in it.50 Accordingly, a person may decide to spe-
cialize in order to acquire or develop a relative advantage." The divi-
sion of labor concept has been raised to the international level and
adapted to the theory of comparative advantage. If a country has a
comparative advantage in the production of certain goods, there is an
efficiency gain from its specialization in producing and exporting them.
Hence, resource-based and labor-intensive products would constitute
the obvious first choice for a populous and capital-poor developing
country, in order to integrate its economy into the international division
of labor."2
However, during the last three decades, a rather new character
has emerged and rapidly increased its importance in the world trade
"' See Amendola, Genesi e Definizione del Modello Teorico del Ciclo del
Prodotto, in CICLO DEL PRODOTTO E DIVISIONE INTERNAZIONALE DEL LAVORO 17,
43 (F. Angeli ed. 1981).
50 Adam Smith explained the theory of division of labor in his classic piece, A.
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(1776).
61 See E. PHELPS, POLITICAL ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTORY TEXT 99 (1985).
52 See Scheid, The Export Needs of Developing Countries and the Need for Ad-
justment in Industrial Countries, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LA-
BOUR: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 44, at 151, 152.
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and investment scene, determining new trends in the international divi-
sion of labor: the transnational corporation (TNO). The profit-increas-
ing instinct of these business organizations has led them to seek new
ways of benefiting from comparative advantages of both industrialized
and developing countries. First, TNCs transferred to developing coun-
tries the production of resource-based, labor-intensive or mature goods,
and later TNCs moved production "stages" from the center to the
periphery.53
The latter type of arrangement is frequently called vertical inte-
gration," and it has generated an international specialization in pro-
duction that contrasts with horizontal integration. Horizontal integra-
tion exists where one group of countries specializes in a certain set of
industries and another group in a set of comparable industries, whereas
vertical integration cuts across industrial processes through overseas-as-
sembly operations.55 Vertically integrated TNCs take advantage of
lower transport costs and developments in communications to split their
operations among two or more countries, leading to a new international
division of labor in manufacturing.
As the United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO) recognized in a 1982 report, competitive pressures in indus-
trial markets have "forced most producers of standardized (or mature)
electronic products to continue their search for ways to transfer parts of
their operations to developing countries where costs are lower."56 This
new specialization in production is also influenced by comparative ad-
vantages of developing nations in the production of resource-based and
labor-intensive goods, sometimes complemented or accentuated by in-
centive measures designed to increase a country's comparatively lower
production costs. 57 Moreover, the new division of labor through vertical
" Fernandez Kelly, supra note 30, at 210.
" Other authors prefer to call such arrangements international integration, as ver-
tical integration may also occur among industries located in one country. See, e.g., J.
BEHRMAN, INDUSTRIAL POLICIES: INTERNATIONAL RESTRUCTURING AND TRANSNA-
TIONALS 2 (1984).
"' Sauvant, The Role of Transnational Enterprises in the Establishment of the
New International Economic Order: A Critical View, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE, IN-
DUSTRIALIZATION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 109, 128 (J.
Lozoya & R. Green eds. 1981).
56 U.N. INDUS. DEV. ORG., CHANGING PATTERNS OF TRADE IN WORLD INDUS-
TRY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE at 6, U.N.
Doc. ID/281, U.N. Sales No. E.82.II.B1 (1982).
11 A study by UNCTAD pointed out that such inducements are not utilized to
acquire a competitive advantage, but rather to put third world nations on an equal
footing with their developed country competitors. U.N. INDUS. DEV. ORG., INCEN-
TIVES FOR INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS at 4, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/184, U.N. Sales No.
E.82.II.DA (1982).
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integration entails an increase in transnational trade among affiliated
companies.58
The expansion of FIZs in the third world is in a way a by-prod-
uct of this evolving international specialization in manufacture and
trade. TNCs are searching for new ways to split their operations
among several countries, while developing nations are willing to ex-
ploit, accentuate, or create comparative advantages in production costs.
Developing countries have been driven to this marriage of interests by
various factors, including the consolidation of export-oriented industri-
alization schemes, the balance of payment disturbances caused by low
prices of raw materials, and the world debt crisis.
2.2.3 Export-Oriented Industrialization Strategies
Historically, the first industrialization strategy selected en masse
by developing countries was import-substitution, namely the promotion
of domestic production of goods that were imported in the past. Under
an import-substitution scheme, the observed pattern of imports provides
a guide to planners in identifying the activities in which manufacturing
can be expanded and should be promoted.5 9 The industries initially se-
lected by developing countries were luxury consumer goods,"0 as im-
port-substitution was seen as a sequence, beginning with light indus-
tries and working its way to intermediate products and on to capital
goods."1 Thus, the eventual success of such a strategy clearly depended
on whether the country could, in the early stage, "build up enough
strength for further industrial growth in terms of successful develop-
ment of entrepreneurship and technical capability." 2
There is consensus among economists on the failure of the import-
substitution scheme. Among the principal reasons frequently given are:
non-conformance with the above-mentioned sequence of protection and
5 One commentator observes that although "at present such intra-firm or intra-
industry trade is (still) complementary or vertical . . . , its quantitative significance, its
rapid growth, the range of traded products and its potential to be influenced by policy
action, suggest that ... it could end up being an important means of expanding and
diversifying exports from developing countries." Laird, Intra-Industry Trade and the
Expansion, Diversification and Integration of the Trade of Developing Countries, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 166 (P. Ghosh ed.
1984).
59 R. BALLANCE & S. SINCLAIR, COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL: INDUSTRY STRATE-
GIES IN A CHANGING WORLD 36 (1983).
0 Karunaratne, supra note 29, at 218.
61 See R. BALLANCE & S. SINCLAIR, supra note 59, at 37.
, Yoneda, Trade Policy of Asian Developing Countries, in Two DECADES OF
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT AND OUTLOOK FOR THE 1980s 203 (T. Haseyama, A. Hirata
& T. Yanagihara eds. 1983).
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promotion; 3 a lack of consideration of the countries' comparative ad-
vantages;" a negative effect in the balance of payments; 5 inadequate
regulation of foreign-owned subsidiaries; 6 outset limitation on local
supply of raw materials; 7 and discrimination against export indus-
tries." Although it has been argued that there is no evidence that "im-
port-substitution per se has adversely affected export growth,"6 9 this
strategy and export-orientation are commonly deemed to be either/or
options, and the reported failure of the former is frequently contrasted
with the spectacular growth attained by the few countries that followed
the export scheme. The star performers following this strategy, so-
called newly industrialized countries (NICs), accounted for nearly sev-
enty-five percent of total third world exports in 1973.70
Among the main features of the export-oriented scheme which
contrast with those of import-substitution, Anne Krueger lists that the
former allows the country to better adapt technological opportunities to
its comparative advantages, prevents the country from establishing re-
strictive and protectionist policies, and leads the government to en-
courage better performance in the local private sector.7 1 Other advan-
tages are a positive effect in the balance of payments72 and the
promotion of employment that results from adopting labor-intensive
technologies.
7
1
Encouraged by the impressive performance of the NICs, since the
63 See R. BALLANCE & S. SINCLAIR, supra note 59, at 38.
" See Yoneda, supra note 62, at 203.
65 See Karunaratne, supra note 29, at 218; C. OMAN, NEW FORMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 33 (1984).
66 See IBRD/IMF Working Group on Access to Capital Markets, The Impact of
Economic Policies of Host Countries on the Flow and Net Benefits of Private Direct
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, reprinted in 1 NEGOTIATING FOREIGN
INVESTMENTS: A MANUAL FOR THE THIRD WORLD 3.1D 3 (R. Hellawell & D. Wal-
lace eds. 1982).
67 See Hernadi, Export Oriented Industrialization and Its Success in the Asian
Pacfic Region, 3 E. ASIA 1, 2 (1983).
68 See R. BALLANCE & S. SINCLAIR, supra note 59, at 38-39.
6 j. AHMAD, IMPORT SUBSTITUTION, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 57 (1978).
70 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEv., TRADE IN MANUFACTURES OF DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/161, U.N. Sales No.
E.76.II.D.8 (1976), cited in Karunaratne, supra note 29, at 218. Figures include Hong
Kong (23%), South Korea (16%), Mexico (9%), Brazil (8%), India (6%), Singapore
(6%), Malaysia (4%) and Argentina (3%).
71 See Krueger, The Experience and Lessons of Asia's Super Exporters, in Ex-
PORT ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 197-99 (1985).
712 See G. MEIER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THE THEORY OF POLICY 316
(1980) (discussion on achieving gains in foreign exchange earnings through export ex-
pansion schemes).
73 See Fels, The Export Needs of Developing Countries and the Adjustment Pro-
cess in Industrial Countries, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR:
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 179 (H. Giersch ed. 1974).
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early 1970s an increasing number of developing countries have gradu-
ally shifted away from import-substitution to export-led policies,7 4 ei-
ther by explicitly emphasizing the promotion of export-oriented indus-
tries or by establishing special incentive regimes for export promotion,
such as the zones. Hence, FIZs may also be seen as a corollary to the
process of selecting industrialization models by developing countries;
implementing FIZs is sometimes a complementary measure of export
promotion, sometimes a liberalizing instrument in the context of an im-
port-substitution scheme.
2.2.4 Debt Crisis and Foreign Exchange Imperatives
Debt servicing has become a major constraint on the balance of
payments of third world countries, a problem exacerbated by high real
interest rates and low prices in basic commodities. Early in 1985, the
outstanding external debt of the third world was calculated to be $812
billion, while debt service payments projected for that year amounted to
$122 billion. 5 In 1987, Latin American countries owed $400 billion,
whereas their total annual exports did not exceed $90 billion. 6
Responses of developing countries to balance-of-payment deficits
have included attempts to reduce foreign exchange expenditures, attract
fresh foreign capital, and increase foreign currency earnings through
exports. Because outflows of foreign currency are difficult to reduce
after they have reached a certain level, and because foreign capital
flows are likely to be quite insignificant, given the difficulties of devel-
oping countries in meeting their current obligations, 7 policies tending
to increase and diversify exports play a very important role in develop-
ing nations.7 s
Some debtor countries promote export industries not in the context
of an industrialization strategy, but as a desperate effort to meet their
"' A recent survey by Colin Kirkpatrick emphasizes that in practice most develop-
ing countries employ elements of both industrialization strategies. See Kirkpatrick,
Trade Policy and Industrialization in LDCs, in SURVEYS IN DEVELOPMENT Eco-
NOMICS 71 (N. Gemmel ed. 1987).
7' Hallberg, International Debt, 1985: Origins and Issues for the Future, in
WORLD DEBT CRISIS 4 (M. Claudon ed. 1985).
76 Kuczinsky, The Outlook for Latin American Debt, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 129, 130
(1987).
7 See Goldsbrough, Investment Trends and Prospects: The Link with Bank
Lending, in INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT: NEW ROLES FOR PRIVATE CAPITAl. 173
(T. Moran ed. 1986).
7s As recently observed, "debtor developing countries must increase significantly
their export earnings as a means of attaining economic growth and improving their
debt situation." A. Thompson, Linking Debt and Trade: A Challenge for Developing
Countries 82 (1988) (LL.M. thesis, available at Harvard Law School Library).
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foreign exchange imperatives. As FIZs have proven to be a significant
source of foreign currency, it is likely that some developing countries
are establishing them in an attempt to confront increasing deficits in
their balances of payments.
2.3 The Aims of FIZs
What are developing countries looking for when establishing FIZs
in their territories? Why are TNCs willing to invest? What can local
entrepreneurs expect of their eventual participation? What interest do
industrial countries have in the establishment of FIZs in the Third
World? This section examines the aims of the establishment of FIZs in
developing countries from the perspective of the main actors in the in-
ternational trade and investment process.
2.3.1 From the Perspective of Developing Countries
It is difficult to generalize when referring to a group as heteroge-
neous as third world countries. Nevertheless, as FIZs follow similar
patterns in responding to a common economic rationale, it seems possi-
ble to identify some general motivations applicable to most of them.
Needless to say, each country ranks these aims according to its particu-
lar needs and possibilities.
a) Export-Promotion Objectives: Although certain FIZs turned out
to be import-oriented, as occurred in Colombia, most of them were es-
tablished during the massive shift to export-orientation and were
designed to enhance foreign commerce. Export-promotion includes ei-
ther the search for new markets for local products 9 or export diversifi-
cation through the promotion of non-traditional trade."0
b) Foreign Exchange Generation: Since most FIZs are established
as a means to promote exports, they imply the objective of yielding
positive effects on the country's balance of payments81 through the gen-
eration of substantial hard currency influxes.
c) Employment Objectives: FIZs are also created to reduce domes-
79 See, e.g., Zonas Francas Industriales para la Exportacion, in INSTITUTO DE
COMERCIO EXTERIOR, 2 COMERCIo EXTERIOR ECUATORIANO: INSTITUCIONES Y
POLITICAS 179 (1984).
80 See, e.g., Art. 3 of the Free Industrial Zones Act bill for Peru, reprinted in
Zonas Francas Industriales, 1 REVISTA PERUANA DE COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL 13,
21 (1982).
81 See generally U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEv., EXPORT PROCESSING FREE
ZONES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRIALIZA-
TION POLICIES, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/211/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.85.II.D.17
(1985) [hereinafter UNCTAD: EPFZs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES].
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tic unemployment.8 2 Some countries have specifically provided that one
purpose of creating FIZs is to safeguard employees' interests against
possible exploitation by establishing adequate labor policies."3
d) Attraction of Foreign Investment: Most countries consider FIZs
as a means to attract foreign investment by offering lower production
costs. The influx of foreign capital and expertise facilitates the develop-
ment of an industrial export-oriented sector in the country,8 ' as TNCs
are considered to be in a better position to open foreign markets for
local products.
e) Exploitation of Natural Resources: Developing countries are
becoming aware of the fact that the local value added to exported goods
will usually determine the balance-of-payments effects and the
macroeconomic impact of a FIZ. Thus, the exploitation of local re-
sources other than labor is becoming an increasingly important concern
when establishing the zones. Some countries have even adopted a policy
of requiring a minimum local content that is fixed when the authoriza-
tion to set up in the zone is granted. 5
f) Industrialization Objectives: As instruments for industrial de-
velopment, FIZs share the general developmental goals attributed to
industrialization, including forward and backward linkages with the
domestic economy.
g) Regional Development: FIZs are frequently located in remote
and relatively poor regions of the country because they facilitate indus-
trial decentralization and regional development.
h) Export Industries Deregulation: Some developing countries see
in FIZs a possibility for insulating the export sector from various regu-
latory policies intended to protect domestic industries.88 Through the
zones, as Samuel Bettwy puts it, "[b]y carving out specifically legislated
areas, a developing country can gracefully operate a dual economy."87
i) "Open Market" Policy Testing: FIZs may also be viewed as
"laboratories" for testing open-market economic policies that may be
later applied in the whole country.88 This occurred in countries such as
82 ESCAP/UNCTC JOINT UNIT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra
note 39, at 16.
8S See, e.g., Meissner, Mexican Border and Free Zone Areas: Implications for
Development, in U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN TRADE RELATIONS: ISSUES AND CONCERNS
264 (M. Czinkota ed. 1983).
84 See J. CURRIE, THE GROWING ROLE OF EPZs, supra note 22, at 20.
85 A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 46.
s That has been the case, for example, in India. See ESCAP/UNCTC JOINT
UNIT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 39, at 16.
11 Bettwy, supra note 7, at 56.
8 See H. GRUBEL, FREE MARKET ZONES: DEREGULATING CANADIAN ENTER-
PRISE 31 (1983).
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Taiwan, where FIZs clearly contributed to a shift from protectionism
to an open economy. 89
j) Political Objectives: The implementation of FIZs may be moti-
vated in part by political or geopolitical considerations. For instance, it
has been reported that the Chinese zone bordering on Shenzen and
Hong Kong is part of a long-term strategy to intensify the process of
economic osmosis before Great Britain hands over the administration of
Hong Kong in 1997.90
2.3.2 From the Perspective of Transnational Investors
Despite the ongoing debate among scholars, there is no widely ac-
cepted definition of TNCs. The reason may be related to differences on
critical issues such as country of incorporation, nationality of share-
holders, organizational form, size, countries of operation, and so on.91
Nevertheless, given the business-organization character of TNCs, iden-
tifying their aims when investing in FIZs is not likely to be as difficult
a task as searching for a generally acceptable definition.
It is clear that the main consideration of TNCs when undertaking
any investment is profit maximization. Therefore, the question of why
multinationals are willing to invest in FIZs in developing countries
could be reduced to an inquiry on the specific means the zones offer to
allow transnational investors to increase their net earnings. The follow-
ing are likely to be among the motivations that influence a TNC's deci-
sion to invest in FIZs.
a) Access to Low-Cost Labor: According to a report by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) the main
reason why foreign investors locate industrial activities in developing
countries is the availability of comparatively cheap, hard-working,
easy-to-train manpower.92 TNCs engaged in labor-intensive production
will take advantage of lower wages, frequently complemented by
favorable employment legislation specially designed for the zones.
b) Duty-Free Imports Regime: The customs duty-free regime ap-
pears to be particularly attractive to TNCs, especially those that are
vertically integrated, as imported materials will constitute a considera-
89 See Jayawardena, supra note 7, at 432.
90 ESCAP/UNCTC JOINT UNIT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra
note 39, at 17.
91 The question seems to be even more complicated today with the rise of third
world multinational corporations, whose importance is rapidly increasing. For a discus-
sion on the emergence of third world TNCs, see Heenan & Keegan, The Rise of Third
World Multinationals, HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 101.
92 UNCTAD, EPFZs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 81, at 12.
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ble percentage of their inputs.
c) Access to Markets: Although FIZs are primarily export-ori-
ented, access to the domestic market can be a relevant consideration for
TNCs, especially in cases such as China, where it has been tradition-
ally difficult to penetrate protectionist barriers.9" Zone investment may
also be important to gain access to extended markets, such as the An-
dean Common Market or the Caribbean Community (CARICOM),
and to third markets, as is occurring with European investments in
Caribbean zones and Japanese investments in Mexican zones, both re-
portedly oriented to the U.S. market.94
d) Home Market Competitiveness: Another motivation for invest-
ing in FIZs, clearly tied to the natural and artificial advantages of re-
ducing production costs, is the possibility of retaining or regaining com-
petitiveness in the TNC's home market. This is especially important
when technology becomes standardized and the TNC must deal with
imported goods sold at a lower price than those produced domestically.
e) Vertical Integration: Intra-firm trade in intermediate products,
namely those that are an output of one production process and an input
to another, generate vertical integration within an industry.9" Due to
the free export and import regime characteristic of the zones, global
industries may find FIZs to be excellent locations for offshore
manufacturing.
f) Product Life-Cycle Extension: In the "mature" phase of a prod-
uct, the decrease in unit price that is a consequence of transferring
stages of production to lower-cost locations motivates TNCs to transfer
the complete production to developing countries.9 FIZs, clearly among
the lowest-cost industrial locations in the world, give TNCs the oppor-
tunity to extend the mature phase of their products' life-cycles.
2.3.3 From the Perspective of Domestic Investors
Local enterpreneurs view the zones as an alternative investment
opportunity that may lead to successful competition in foreign markets.
Lower production costs vis-a-vis any other location in the country
might also constitute an incentive to seek access to the local market.
11 See Cable & Mukherjee, Foreign Investment in Low-Income Developing Coun-
tries, in INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: NEW ROLES FOR PRIVATE CAPITAL? 104 (T.
Moran ed. 1986).
9' It has also been reported that TNCs operate in third world zones to gain access
to industrial countries by complying with the local content requirements of the Genera-
lized System of Preferences. See Karunaratne, supra note 29, at 222.
95 See M. CASSON, MULTINATIONALS AND WORLD TRADE: VERTICAL INTE-
GRATION AND THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN WORLD INDUSTRIES 11 (1986).
96 See Amendola, supra note 49, at 135.
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a) Duty-Free Regime: Domestic investors may enjoy the benefits of
being exempted from paying customs duties when purchasing capital
goods and intermediate products. This would lower production costs,
giving the local entrepreneur an advantage both for international and
local sales.
b) Special Incentive Measures: Although domestic investors oper-
ating within the customs territory of the country enjoy the benefits of
low wages and access to raw materials, FIZs offer them the additional
advantage of an incentive package, i.e., infrastructure facilities, tax ben-
efits, financial incentives, free exchange regulations, labor incentives,
etc.
c) International Competitiveness Acquisition: Lower production
costs, resulting from duty-free imports and special incentives, determine
a lower final FOB price that makes zone industries more competitive in
the world market.97 In addition, special arrangements such as joint ven-
tures and international subcontracting allow domestic enterpreneurs an
opportunity to develop managerial skills to operate at international
standards.
d) Dual Economy Operation: Local entrepreneurs may be willing
to support the establishment of FIZs as a means to ensure that protec-
tionist measures sheltering their domestic industries remain in place
while they take advantage of lower costs of production, both for exports
and domestic sales.
98
2.3.4 From the Perspective of Industrialized Countries
Industrial countries have encouraged the development of FIZs in
third world countries, by creating special tariff structures allowing
goods that were previously exported to be imported subject to ad
valorem tariffs levied only on the value added abroad, exclusive of the
value originated in the home country. 9  For instance, in 1983, U.S. im-
ports of assembled goods under the so-called "806-807" classifications
(articles previously exported for repair, alteration, processing, or assem-
97 It has been noted, however, that this advantage may be curtailed via the imposi-
tion of non-tariff barriers in industrial countries. See R. GIRLING, MULTINATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD: MANAGEMENT, DEBT, AND TRADE CON-
FI.I(a's IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1985).
"I According to a report on South Pacific countries, the fundamental reason un-
derlying local advocacy for FIZs is the promise that they will enable the national bour-
geois to seek wealth in the world beyond, while affecting minimally the social order in
the rest of the country. See Howard, Export Processing Zones and Development Strate-
gies in the South Pacific, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND EXPORT-ORI-
EN'IED INDUSTRIALIZATION 81 (E. Utrecht ed. 1985).
9 See Casson & Pearce, Multinational Enterprises in LDCs, in SURVEYS IN DE-
VFI.OPMENT ECONOMICS 90, 111 (N. Gemmell ed. 1987).
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bling abroad) amounted to $21.8 billion, of which the total value
originating in the United States was only $5.2 billion.100 Some of the
reasons given to justify such an indirect support are identified below.
a) Home Market Defense: John Grunwald and Kenneth Flamm
have found that production arrangements abroad have allowed certain
U.S. businesses to remain competitive in the face of serious threats from
imports.101 In fact, given the high wages of low-skilled labor in devel-
oped countries some labor-intensive industries have had to transfer pro-
duction stages to FIZs in order to protect their positions in home mar-
kets against foreign competitors.
b) Foreign Market Competitiveness: The principle mentioned
above also allows the industries of developed countries that shift labor-
intensive production to FIZs in developing countries to gain or regain
competitiveness in foreign markets. Mark Casson has recently written
that proximity to export-processing free zones may be a competitive
advantage to a mature economy because such proximity reduces that
economy's overall cost of production relative to those of other mature
industrial economies.
10 2
c) Lower Consumer Prices: As a general rule, lower costs of pro-
duction result in lower prices to consumers, another benefit that an in-
dustrial economy may obtain as a result of foreign assembling and
manufacturing in third world FIZs. For example, it has been estimated
that the gain in welfare to U.S. purchasers of semiconductors, as a re-
sult of the internationalization of such industry, has been about ten
percent of the value of consumption.0
d) Geopolitical Considerations: The rationale of encouraging the
implementation of FIZs may sometimes be found in geopolitical consid-
erations. For instance, the geopolitical importance of South Korea and
Taiwan to the United States is listed among the favorable international
circumstances that made it possible for those countries to develop a
competitive industry.'" The development of each was initially based on
the implementation of FIZs.
100 V. BAILEY & S. BOWDEN, UNDERSTANDING UNITED STATES FOREIGN
TRADE DATA 51 (U.S. Dep't. of Commerce 1987). For an analysis on the impact of
tariff 806 and 807 in Mexican FIZs, see Wertman, Tariff Items 807.00 and 806.30
and the Mexican Maquiladoras, in Maquiladora Impact on U.S. Jobs and Trade
Competition with Japan: Hearing before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government
Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 2 at 218
(1987).
101 J. GRUNWALD & K. FLAMM, THE GLOBAL FACTORY: FOREIGN ASSEMBLY
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 221 (1985).
101 M. CASSON, supra note 95, at 6.
1*1 J. GRUNWALD & K. FLAMM, supra note 101, at 221.
104 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 74, at 79.
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2.4 Types of Investments in FIZs
Although it seems possible to find general patterns applicable to
most investments in FIZs, it is valuable for this analysis to identify four
types of investments in the zones, reflecting the convergence of various
historical, political, and economic factors. As there is no single criterion
for such a classification, the following simply addresses the question of
what characteristics of different types of investments developing coun-
tries should consider when regulating FIZs.
2.4.1 Foreign Export-Oriented Manufacturers
Export-oriented companies are foreign branches, or locally incor-
porated corporations wholly owned by a TNC, that undertake all
stages of production of goods to be sold in foreign markets. These com-
panies may take full advantage of local resources, and of the attractive
framework of FIZs, benefiting from low labor costs, a duty-free regime,
industrial-estate infrastructure, and other special incentives. In turn,
foreign companies might bring external capital, expertise, and technol-
ogy to the country, along with accomplishing the aims of generating
employment, increasing foreign exchange earnings, and decentralizing
industry.
In spite of the suitability of export-oriented subsidiaries in the
scheme of FIZs, several factors, such as the emergence of a new inter-
national specialization in manufacturing, the protectionist measures of
industrial countries, and the lower costs in transportation, have resulted
in a recent trend of multinationals transferring only labor-intensive
stages of production to the zones, while retaining capital-intensive and
high-technology stages in their home countries. According to a report
by UNCTAD, vertically integrated TNCs are currently deemed to be
the most important investors in FIZs located in developing countries. 05
2.4.2 Foreign Intra-Firm Assemblers
One form of international integration found in the zones is fre-
quently called off-shore manufacturing or foreign assembling. Assem-
bling through international integration is a relatively recent phenome-
non." 6 It consists of the production-sharing relationship between a
'0 See UNCTAD, EPFZs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 81, at 12.
10' Off-shore assembling emerged as domestic labor-intensive production became
less and less economical and competition increased, forcing U.S. firms to look to other
countries, breaking production into stages and carrying out the labor-intensive stages in
locations where wages were comparatively low. See J. GRUNWALD & K. FLAMM,
supra note 101, at 11.
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"principal" firm, normally located in an industrial country, and its
subsidiary, usually located in a developing country, each one undertak-
ing one or more manufacturing processes to co-produce a final good. 07
FIZs provide an ideal environment for intra-firm activities. In
fact, as one author has correctly pointed out, the emergence and devel-
opment of off-shore production and export processing zones are tightly
connected."0 8 Among the factors that have determined this relationship
are the duty-free import and export regime inherent to the concept of
FIZs, favorable tariff regulations in industrial countries, infrastructure
facilities existing at the zones, and the incentive packages usually of-
fered in addition to the main feature of low-cost wages.
There has been a good deal of discussion on the costs and benefits
of intra-firm trade for developing countries, mostly related to the need
for minimal investment, the low cost in moving zone companies, and
the difficulties faced by developing countries trying to control and regu-
late intra-firm activities in a vertically integrated scheme.1 9 It has been
observed that sharing in the manufacturing of products provides a par-
tial compromise between the promotion of non-traditional exports from
developing nations and the rising pressures for protectionist measures
in industrial countries.110
2.4.3 International Subcontractors1
International subcontracting has been defined as a business rela-
tionship involving a "principal" contractor, based in an industrial na-
tion, that places orders with a subcontractor in a developing country, to
produce components or assemble products with inputs provided by the
principal or its affiliates. The final product is normally sold by the
principal, frequently in its home market.1 2
Subcontracting is distinguishable from intra-firm co-production in
107 The rationale of foreign assembly is that an industry's production can be car-
ried out in one or more plants located in one or more countries, and one or more
processes may be carried out within these production units. Laird, supra note 58, at
167.
'08 Fernandez Kelly, supra note 30, at 207.
"09 Mark Casson lists among these concerns the concentration of global economic
power in TNCs, the economic dependency of developing countries, and the fiscal conse-
quences of transfer pricing. M. CASSON, supra note 95, at 10.
110 J. GRUNWALD & K. FLAMM, supra note 101, at 2.
"I The term international subcontracting, as used in this subsection, should not
be confused with the legal concept of "subcontract," which refers to an agreement with
obligations that are subordinated to those of a previous agreement (the "principal con-
tract") in the sense that the purpose of the former is to contribute to the performance of
the latter.
12 C. OMAN, supra note 65, at 17.
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regard to the identity of the parties involved in each arrangement. In
the latter, the TNC deals with its own subsidiary, so that the com-
pany's headquarters is the only source of business decisions. Con-
versely, in a subcontracting arrangement, the TNC deals with an inde-
pendent enterprise with a position in vertical integration not necessarily
identical to that of the TNC. The arrangement will frequently be com-
plex, however, involving technological assistance, quality control, out-
put requirements entitling the TNC to commercialize the final product,
and input obligations requiring the TNC to purchase most intermedi-
ate products from the foreign company.
In comparison to intra-firm trade, subcontracting stimulates local
entrepreneurs to participate in outward-oriented industries. Domestic
corporations are in a position to acquire a certain degree of expertise in
producing and marketing at international standards, and they tend to
maximize linkages with the domestic economy."' 3 It is nonetheless de-
batable whether subcontracting brings significant benefits to the host
economy, since it is usually tied to standardized or mature technology,
and it links scarce local capital and managerial skills to industrial activ-
ities that are dependent on TNCs' business decisions and strategies."1 4
2.4.4 Export-Oriented Domestic Industries
As a Japanese researcher wrote some years ago, export- promotion
programs should recognize that local entrepreneurship is one of the key
requirements for success but often an extremely scarce resource. Conse-
quently, an export strategy must include a comprehensive plan creating
favorable conditions allowing both foreign investors and local business-
people to operate complementarily." 5
Even though one of the aims of developing countries in establish-
ing FIZs is to attract foreign investments, local participation is often
encouraged by host countries and uniformly permitted in full export-
oriented industries.11 6 Local participation usually takes place through
direct investment in export-oriented industries, but a trend to partici-
123 It has also been observed that subcontracting facilitates the transfer of technol-
ogy and provides the opportunity for national firms to improve their expertise through
practical experience. J. GRUNWALD & K. FLAMM, supra note 101, at 250-51.
14 For a discussion of the impact of subcontracting in developing countries see
Germidis, International Sub-contracting and Industrialisation of the Third World:
Problems and Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL SUBCONTRACTING 10 (D. Germidis
ed. 1980).
... See Yoneda, supra note 62, at 203-04.
... Basile and Germidis have pointed out that sometimes local investments in the
zones take place spontaneously, as occurred in the Beirut FIZ in Lebanon. A. BASILE
& D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 57.
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pate in joint ventures with foreign investors has been observed in the
last decade.' For instance, in 1980, of a total of 101 projects in the
Masan and Iri FIZs in South Korea, thirty-seven were joint ventures
in which local partners had a majority holding in sixty percent of the
cases."
8
An export-oriented local industry may be vertically integrated
with a TNC via subcontracting or may compete by itself in the interna-
tional market. In the latter circumstance, the local industry can take
advantage of comparatively lower costs in labor and domestic resources,
as well as of the duty-free regime, incentive packages, and physical in-
frastructure of FIZs.
Linkages with the domestic economy seem to be intrinsic to local
investments in the zones. As a general rule, backward linkages with the
host economy are seen as an advantage, as they increase the demand of
locally produced raw materials, intermediate products and services.
Conversely, forward linkages may conflict with certain aims of the host
country to the extent that local industries may take advantage of the
zone to lower costs of producing goods containing a high level of im-
ported inputs that are to be sold in the domestic market.
3. AN EVALUATION OF FIZs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
One confronts several obstacles in evaluating the performance of
FIZs in developing countries . First, various political, economic, social,
and geographical factors within each of the countries make it somewhat
artificial to compare the actual impact of the zones in their quest for
development. Second, expectations and reliance on the success of the
zones vary considerably from one country to the other, and success must
be evaluated in the context of a particular development strategy. Third,
the countries' aims when establishing the zones are not identically
ranked by all of them, making it extremely difficult to identify steady
patterns by which to measure the zones' eventual success. Finally, the
seniority of certain zones provides greater potential for evaluating their
performance, whereas most of the recently established FIZs are in the
process of acquiring a share of the international investment portfolio,
making an attempt to evaluate their performance premature.
Nevertheless, as discussed in the first part of this article, FIZs re-
117 Some governments limit local participation to a certain percentage of equity, as
in the Karachi FIZ, where Pakistani citizens are not permitted to invest more than 15
percent of the total capital. ESCAP/UNCTC JOINT UNIT ON TRANSNATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS, supra note 39, at 33.
11 See A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 57.
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present the application of one general theory, and they are established
to achieve certain developmental goals attributed to their operation. Al-
though generalizations do not appear to be convenient in the evaluation
of the zones, empirical studies have shown that the outcome of their
implementation has been consistent enough in several respects to estab-
lish some general characteristics of the operation of FIZs in developing
countries. Furthermore, in spite of substantial differences between de-
veloping countries, it is clear that they share several problems and defi-
ciencies intrinsic to underdevelopment. Therefore, it is likely that the
actual impact of a given policy in one particular zone will be a good
reference for estimating the convenience of adopting a similar measure
in another country.
There are several ways to approach an evaluation of FIZs. One
possibility is a case-by-case analysis of the existing zones, followed by a
summary of findings. This approach would be indisputably adequate if
the available data for every zone were comparable. Such is clearly not
the case, for those studies that have adopted a case-by-case approach
have carried out their own field evaluations of the FIZs to be com-
pared, or have attempted to unify the information available from differ-
ent sources. 19 A different perspective-perhaps more realistic given the
existing data-consists of a general survey of the zones, aimed at identi-
fying problems that have barred the accomplishment of projected aims.
This approach has been followed in several previous works120 and pro-
vides the structure of the following survey.
At least two different standards for measuring the success or fail-
ure of FIZs are possible. An objective criterion may be adopted, i.e.,
conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the actual impact of the zones in
the economy of a given country. 21 To determine the net benefits and
costs to the rest of the country's economy, it would be necessary to com-
19 The former approach has been followed by the ESCAP/UNCTC JOINT
UNIT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 39. Examples of the latter
perspective can be found in J. CURRIE, EPZs IN THE 1980S, supra note 20, and Note,
Foreign Trade Zones in Latin America, supra note 7.
120 See, e.g., A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3; UNCTAD, EPFZs IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 81.
21 Unfortunately, very few analyses of the type have been undertaken, and most
of the existing studies concentrate on the Asia-Pacific region. Peter Warr is one scholar
who has conducted several economic cost-benefit analyses in the Asia-Pacific region.
Among the studies are included: P. WARR, PROMOTION VIA INDUSTRIAL ENCLAVES:
THE PHILIPPINES' BATAAN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES (University of the Philip-
pines School of Economics Discussion Paper No. 8407, 1984); P. WARR, KOREAN
MASSAN FREE EXPORT ZONE: BENEFITS AND COSTS (Development Studies Centre,
The Australian National University, Occasional Paper No. 36, 1983); and Warr, The
Jakarta Export Processing Zone: Benefits and Costs, 19 BULL. OF INDONESIAN ECON.
STUD. 28 (1983).
[Vol. 11:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol11/iss1/2
FREE INDUSTRIAL ZONES
pare the situation with the zone to the hypothetical situation without it,
but under an alternative set of industrial policies.12 An alternative
standard consists of an inquiry into whether the zones have accom-
plished the aims that led developing countries to adopt them. The fol-
lowing sections of this article are devoted to this type of teleological
analysis. The objective is both to determine the role of FIZs in develop-
ment and to identify legal and policy questions arising from their im-
plementation and operation.
3.1 A Third World Overview of FIZs
Have FIZs succeeded in achieving the developmental goals attrib-
uted to them by third world nations? The degree of attention paid to
FIZs since their inception in the mid-1960s suggests a positive answer,
as the number of zones has increased from a total of nine at the end of
the 1960s to 107 FIZs in fifty-one developing countries by the end of
1987.12 The steady expansion of the concept in third world nations is
explained in part by the enthusiastic support given it by development
organizations such as UNIDO, UNCTAD, and the Japanese organi-
zation AMPO in the early 1970s.12
There seems to be a common belief among developing countries in
the guaranteed success of FIZs in achieving export-oriented industriali-
zation goals in the context of a world economy which favors export-
oriented schemes. However, an initial examination of the performance
of FIZs in the third world leads to the conclusion that there have been
both highly successful zones and total fiascos. Some of the former bene-
fited from particularly propitious circumstances, while others simply
managed to learn from the mistakes of the failures. The fact is that
both successes and failures provide important policy lessons for those
engaged in establishing or restructuring FIZs in developing countries.
Global statistics on FIZs are relatively rare. The few studies avail-
able give only a slight idea of their impact, inasmuch as figures are
extremely difficult to evaluate when abstracted from a specific eco-
nomic, social, and political framework. For instance, various sources
have suggested that zone industries provide over a million jobs in the
third world. In certain countries zone employment amounts to more
than five percent of the economically active population. In most nations,
however, it represents little more than one percent of the manufactur-
12 See ESCAP/UNCTC JOINT UNIT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
supra note 39, at 62.
11" For an updated list of FIZs operating in developing countries, see the Appen-
dix to this article.
12. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5; Jayawardena, supra note 7, at 429 n.10.
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ing work force. 2
There is no single benchmark by which to judge whether a partic-
ular zone has been successful or not. Most analysts, however, would
agree that an FIZ's performance should be measured not only by the
amount of investment it has attracted, but also by the extent to which
the zone has stimulated the local economy.1"' Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to understand that the macroeconomic effects of the zones are often
very limited. "[O]ne should not be under the illusion that a few
cordoned-off areas, where essentially the subsidiaries of foreign compa-
nies are permitted to produce for foreign markets, can lead to an econ-
omy-wide growth process on a significant scale.
' 1 27
A region-by-region evaluation of the zones may help to draw some
interesting conclusions about their performance. Perhaps the most im-
portant conclusion is that there are both successful and unsuccessful
FIZs in almost every region in the world, suggesting that, under appro-
priate circumstances, a properly structured zone may succeed any-
where. 2 Among the zones generally considered the most prosperous
are those of Mauritius and Tunisia in Africa; the Dominican Republic
and Haiti in the Caribbean; China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan in East Asia;
and Brazil and Mexico in Latin America. Other relatively well-to-do
FIZs are those located in Egypt, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Pakistan,
Panama, Syria, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates. Among the
less prosperous zones today are those of Bermuda, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Senegal, and Western Samoa.
Every successful or unsuccesful zone is the result of several conver-
gent elements, both external and internal. However, the legal imple-
mentation of adequate or inadequate policies related to the operation of
the zones is believed to have played a significant role. The following
section is devoted to identifying those legal and policy lessons and to
analyzing some of the most significant issues in the implementation and
operation of FIZs in developing countries.
125 Similarly, a study by UNCTAD found that in many developing nations zone
exports represent less than five percent of total manufactured exports. See UNCTAD,
EPFZs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 81, at 5. In some developing countries
zone exports account for more than 15% of gross national exports.
126 See, e.g., Jayawardena, supra note 7, at 429.
127 U.N. ECONOMIC & SOCIAL COMM'N FOR ASIA & THE PACIFIC, DEVELOP-
MENT STRATEGIES FOR THE 1980s IN SOUTH ASIA at 19, U.N. Doe. ST/ESCAP/154,
U.N. Sales No. E.81.II.F. 16 (1981).
128 There are FIZs operating in seven countries in Africa, eight countries in the
Caribbean, fifteen countries and territories in East Asia and the Pacific, fourteen coun-
tries in Latin America (including Central America), and five countries in the Middle
East. See infra app.
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3.2 Surveying the Performance of FIZs in Developing Nations
3.2.1 Development Costs and Zone Profitability
A report by UNCTAD emphasizes that the cost of construction of
the FIZ estate crucially influences its profitability, and the report ad-
vises developing countries to avoid excessive expenditure in the zone's
estate development.1"9 In fact, the industrial-estate feature of offering a
complete physical infrastructure, including basic services and facilities,
has proven to be a significant factor for the success of the zones. This
expenditure is frequently justified in that the selected host region will
experience an impulse towards development, since part of the goods
and services required for the operation of the zones would be generated
locally.
Naturally, the cost of developing a zone varies considerably from
one country to another. Perhaps the most telling illustration of the im-
portance of carefully considering the required investment is the Bataan
FIZ in the Philippines, where the final development cost exceeded $208
million, an extremely heavy burden even for a highly successful pro-
ject.'80 The development cost per hectare of FIZs in Asian countries
has ranged from $13,000 in Pakistan to $602,900 in the Philippines.'
In other regions of the world the situation seems to be comparable. 1
2
The relatively high overall infrastructure costs of the zones, as
well as the recent experience of unprofitable FIZs, requires that devel-
oping countries insure that certain conditions are met by the selected
location prior to investing in zone development. For instance, the expe-
rience of zones such as the Buenaventura FIZ in Colombia and the
Santo Tomas de Castillo FIZ in Guatemala shows that lack of access to
adequate communications systems constitutes a severe handicap for the
success of the zones.' The moral is that FIZs should be located near
airports and seaports, and preferably close to international routes to
major markets."'
The availability of sufficient energy and water supplies has also
12 UNCTAD, EPFZs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 81, at 6.
130 See ESCAP/UNCTC JOINT UNIT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
supra note 39, at 65.
131 Id., at 64.
132 For instance, the investment required to develop a zone on the coast of Peru
was calculated to be $314,000 per hectare in 1985. See Ciriani, Zonas Francas Indus-
triales, in PROYEcTO PERU: HAcIA UN PLAN NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO A MEDI-
ANO Y LARGO PLAZO 252 (Sociedad Nacional de Industrias ed. 1985).
133 See A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 36.
13, As Currie puts it, "[T]here must be good and relatively inexpensive transport
links with the markets which the country is intending to serve." J. CURRIE, THE
GROWING ROLE OF EPZs, supra note 22, at 20.
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proven to be critical for the investment decision, since they are impor-
tant for industrial activities, and their installation costs are frequently
high."3 5 Basic facilities are not the only factors influencing the prefer-
ence of industrial investors for zones located near relatively urban ar-
eas. David Wall reports that proximity to specialized services such as
postal, banking, and telecommunications facilities is among the main
reasons cited by firms choosing to set up in FIZs.' 6
In recent years developing countries have been testing two systems
designed to avoid the high costs of zone development. One is the afore-
mentioned concept of sub-zones or bonded manufacturing warehouses,
which allows the country to authorize industrial establishments located
outside zones to operate under the same regime as enterprises estab-
lished within FIZs. This concept has been successfully adopted by
countries such as Colombia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Singapore,
Sri Lanka, and Tunisia. The second innovation, adopted in recent zone
regulations in several countries, allows private entrepreneurs to under-
take the construction and exploitation of FIZs, provided that govern-
ment authorization is granted beforehand.1 37 This system has already
been utilized by countries such as the Bahamas and offers the advan-
tage of allowing a country to establish a zone without incurring devel-
opment costs.
3.2.2 Employment Generation and Working Conditions
According to UNCTAD and UNIDO, the labor force employed
in FIZs in developing countries by the beginning of this decade was
estimated to be slightly under one million persons.38 Figures compiled
by Mark Casson indicate that 645,800 workers were employed in the
zones in 1978, and that Korea (with 120,000 workers), Singapore (with
105,000), and Mexico (with 70,000) accounted for nearly forty-five
percent of the total. 3 9 By 1983, Jean Currie calculated that at least
'3 Basile and Germidis list the inadequacy of water and energy supplies among
the serious disadvantages experienced by the costly Bataan FIZ in the Philippines that
led the government to locate the new zones in urban regions where good services were
available. See A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 36.
's8 See Note, Export Processing Zones, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 478, 483 (1976)
(authored by D. Wall).
113 See, e.g., art. 39 of Law No. 105 of 1985 [Colombian Free Zones Statute],
supra note 35, at 11. See also arts. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Uruguayan Free
Zones Act of 1988, in 330 DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA ORIENTAL DEL URU-
GUAY 75, 76 (1988).
138 UNCTAD, EPFZs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 81, at 18. See
also U.N. INDUS. DEv. ORG., EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES at 10, U.N. Doc. UNIDO/ICIS.176 (1980).
'39 M. CASSON, supra note 95, at 5.
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837,500 jobs existed in FIZs located in 35 developing nations and
found that Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Haiti, Mexico,
and Brazil employed more than 50,000 workers each.'40
The relative importance of FIZs as an employment generation
strategy in a particular country should be evaluated in connection with
the size of its economy. For instance, in 1981, zones in Mexico em-
ployed 119,500 workers, which accounted for only 0.72% of the total
economically active population, whereas zone jobs in Mauritius repre-
sented 6.72% of the active population, even though they employed only
20,151 persons. 14 1 One commentator has written that industrial export
expansion is a driving force in creating employment only in the case of
relatively small economies: "For large developing countries, the export
promotion of manufactures, while appealing and efficacious for other
purposes, offers little immediate hope of substantial relief from their
employment problems.'
142
Nevertheless, the number of jobs generated by the zones in devel-
oping countries is far from negligible, accounting as it does for about
three percent of the total registered workforce in manufacturing in the
third world. 4" A study by the International Labor Organization (ILO)
concluded that FIZs have been successful in generating new direct em-
ployment in labor-intensive activities in Asian countries. The study also
pointed out, however, that the total manufacturing sector is still a rela-
tively small segment of their economies. 44
The indirect employment effects of FIZs are relatively small, in
part because of the high level of imported inputs used as a consequence
of the duty-free regime characteristic of zone manufacturing. Following
a categorization by Sanjaya Lall, according to whom indirect employ-
ment effects may be either macroeconomic, horizontal, or vertical, 45 it
can be said that macroeconomic effects are more likely to occur in ser-
vice-oriented activities, such as banking, communications, transporta-
tion, electricity, construction, maintenance and repairs. On the other
hand, as discussed below, vertical and horizontal linkages with the do-
mestic economy are very limited, as local value added in zone produc-
140 See J. CURRIE, EPZs IN THE 1980s, supra note 20, at 5-6.
141 See A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 47.
142 Tyler, Employment Generation and the Promotion of Manufactured Exports
in Less Developed Countries: Some Suggestive Evidence, in THE INTERNATIONAL Di-
VISION OF LABOUR: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 363 (H. Giersch ed. 1974).
143 See UNCTAD, EPFZs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 81, at 18.
144 R. MAEX, EMPLOYMENT AND MULTINATIONALS IN ASIAN EXPORT
PROCESSING ZONES 64, 65 (International Labour Office Working Paper No. 26, 1983)
[hereinafter ILO, EMPLOYMENT IN ASIAN EPZs].
145 See P. ENDERWICK, MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS & LABOUR 49-50 (1985).
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tion is low, and as access of zone products to domestic markets still
seems to be an exception.
The characteristics of the worker population in FIZs have at-
tracted the attention of economists and sociologists. The typical zone
worker is a young, unmarried woman with no previous work experi-
ence. 1" Several charges, ranging from the disruption of the family to
exploitation of women workers, have been made against this peculiar
composition of the zones' workforce. From the economic viewpoint, per-
haps the most serious critique is that instead of eradicating unemploy-
ment, FIZs may actually induce it by encouraging groups that might
otherwise not work to join the labor force.147 A counter-argument is
that women workers predominate in certain assembly operations every-
where in the world. 4 This "feminization" of jobs must be understood
in a broader perspective, for "a growing number of jobs in countries
like the United States are acquiring characteristics formerly associated
with female employment," namely low-skill jobs that provide compara-
tively low wages and offer limited possibilities of promotion.149
A number of issues have been raised regarding the quality of em-
ployment in FIZs, both with respect to employment policies and the
circumstances of zone workers themselves. Several countries have
adopted special labor regulations that apply only within the zones, in
an attempt to attract industrial investors, whom it is believed would
otherwise be discouraged from investing because of the risk of unioniza-
tion, demands for job security, etc. This attitude has reportedly led to
abuses by zone employers. In several FIZs, work environments are sub-
standard, safety measures are almost nonexistent, strikes are banned,
industrial injury compensation is lacking, workers are employed on a
temporary basis, and working hours are frequently extended. A 1977
report by AMPO found violations of internationally set labor standards
and basic human rights in zone establishments. 5
In deciding whether or not to grant socially expensive labor advan-
tages to potential investors, policy-makers should bear in mind the case
'" In Asia, for example, the proportion of women workers in FIZs ranged from
74% in the Philippines to 88% in Sri Lanka; an average of about 80% of zone workers
were under the age of 29; unmarried workers accounted for more than 70% in most
zones; and newcomers to the labor market ranged from 52% in Malaysia to 76% in Sri
Lanka. ILO, EMPLOYMENT IN ASIAN EPZs, supra note 144, at 49-51.
147 See J. GRUNWALD & K. FLAMM, supra note 101, at 226-227.
148 Id. at 227.
149 Fernandez Kelly, supra note 30, at 208.
150 See Jayawardena, supra note 7, at 429. Interestingly, other commentators have
written that "working conditions in assembly plants are generally thought to be some-
what better than in firms of similar size in the rest of the country." J. GRUNWALD &
K. FLAMM, supra note 101, at 228.
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of Mexico, where some of the most successful zone operations are lo-
cated. Employment in Mexican FIZs is subject to the Federal Labor
Law applicable throughout the country. Workers' rights include, a
minimum required salary, bonuses, profit sharing, social security con-
tributions, severance pay, housing, education and day-care contribu-
tions, and unions are easy to establish."' 1 This has not prevented inves-
tors from establishing industries in these zones, which now employ over
300,000 workers.1 52 "The benefits accorded employees under this law
may appear to be overly generous by American standards, but it should
be remembered that the total cost of a minimum wage employee in
Mexico, including all taxes and benefits, is low (less than $1 per
hour)."
3.2.3 Foreign Exchange Earnings and Local Value Added
Substantial foreign exchange earnings are derived from exports
originating in FIZs. They account, for instance, for twenty percent or
more of manufacturing exports in countries such as Hong Kong, Ma-
laysia, Mauritius, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and
Tunisia.1 54 In fact, a study by UNCTAD underscores the fact that the
main benefit host economies derive from FIZs is the net foreign ex-
change inflow obtained in the form of export proceeds and investment
capital.
1 55
However, given the provision of free access to imports, a greater-
than-average use of imported inputs is characteristic of zone produc-
tion. There is a considerable difference between gross foreign exchange
generation and net foreign currency earnings. 56 Consequently, to mea-
sure the effect of zones on the host country's balance of payments one
has to consider the amount of local value added to manufactured goods
which, together with the initial capital investment of transnational in-
vestors, will constitute the net foreign exchange earnings of the host
economy. This has been well understood by several developing coun-
tries such as India, which imposed a minimum of thirty percent local
151 See Note, An Investors' Introduction to Mexico's Maquiladora Program, 22
TEx. INT'L L.J. 109, 134 & n.204 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Mexico's Maquiladora
Program].
152 See Clement, An Overview of the Maquiladora Industry, 18 CALIF. W. INT'L
L.J. 55, 56 (1988).
1S Note, Mexico's Maquiladora Program, supra note 151, at 134.
14 See J. CURRIE, EPZs IN THE 1980s, supra note 22, at 36.
15 UNCTAD, EPFZs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 81, at 6.
156 For instance, it has been reported that the net imported content in goods man-
ufactured at the Sri Lankan FIZs was 68% in 1983. J. CURUE, EPFZs IN THE 1980s,
supra note 20, at 36.
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inputs on enterprises willing to set up in one of its zones. Under
similar policies, high percentages of local content have been reached in
other FIZs such as those located in Korea (52%) and Taiwan (46%).158
Nonetheless, a significant level of domestic inputs is still far from
being the general rule. The local content of zone products is quite low
even in countries such as Brazil and Mexico, where the level of indus-
trialization would presumably determine comparatively lower costs and
higher quality in locally produced inputs.15' This phenomenon also
seems to be related to various new trends in transnational trade and
investment, particularly vertical integration and transfer pricing.
As most of the vertically integrated production is destined to be
sold in industrial countries' markets, TNCs have been legitimately con-
cerned with the maintenance of high standards of quality required by
consumers in such markets. In addition, due to special regimes in force
in several developed countries that encourage off-shore manufacturing
through charging customs duties only to the value added abroad, the
use of imported inputs in vertically integrated production could ulti-
mately be less costly for the transnational investor. It is the general
practice of vertically integrated TNCs to overcharge for goods and ser-
vices, or inflate the interest rate of loans to a subsidiary, as a mecha-
nism to reallocate worldwide profits in countries where tax rates are
lower and remittance-of-dividends regulations are less exacting. Appar-
ently, TNCs' opportunities to engage in transfer pricing practices in-
crease with the volume of intra-firm trade of goods, services, and capi-
tal, while the potential for governments to control such activities
decreases.
In summary, although the effect of FIZs in the net balance of pay-
ment is somewhat significant and is in fact one of the most relevant
features .of the zones today, it is marginal when compared with the
gross exports of zone production. Developing countries are beginning to
realize the importance of making every effort both to induce use of local
'5 See A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 46.
See ESCAP/UNCTC JOINT UNrr ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
supra note 39, at 78-80. The case of Taiwan constitutes a very interesting policy expe-
rience. In the beginning, local suppliers were unable to provide inputs which satisfied
international standards. Experts from the zones were placed at the potential suppliers'
factories to offer advice on manufacturing methods and quality control. The results
were quite impressive: a rise in local content from 8% in 1969 to 46% in 1979. Id. at
80.
159 For instance, despite efforts made by Mexican authorities to induce industrial
investors in the "maquiladoras" program to increase their procurement of local raw
materials and components, the results obtained have so far been modest, with a 16% of
domestic value added, most of which corresponds to labor wages. See A. BASILE & D.
GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 48.
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inputs in zone manufacturing as a means of increasing net hard cur-
rency earnings and to encourage linkages with the domestic economy.
3.2.4 Do Fiscal Concessions Work?
FIZs in developing countries are generally considered to be tax
havens. In addition to customs-duties concessions, which are the modus
vivendi of free zones, it is common to find that industries are exempt
from income, property, and sales taxes, thus enjoying a fiscal regime
that is clearly more favorable than that in force in the rest of the coun-
try. Most countries offer tax holidays to zone producers, exempting
them from all or most taxes for periods of up to fifteen years. These
incentives are usually complemented by zone industries' being allowed
to carry forward losses incurred during the tax exemption period, to be
set against subsequent taxable profits, and also by free or accelerated
depreciation of investment costs for zone industries.' The net cost of
fiscal incentives for the host country-or, more precisely, the loss of
revenues-is quite substantial.' 6 '
Despite the importance that third world governments assign to tax
concessions, they have not turned out to be of as much practical signifi-
cance as anticipated.' 2 Foreign investors in FIZs "have confirmed that
complete exemption from taxes on corporate profits did not signifi-
cantly influence their investment decisions and that investments would
still have been made if the host countries had charged a moderate tax
on corporate profits."'6 3 Moreover, it has been pointed out that a num-
ber of successful zones, such as the Philippines FIZs, offer no tax con-
cessions at all, suggesting that long tax holidays may be overly gener-
ous.' 4  There is an increasing concern over the degree of
competitiveness that such incentives induce among developing countries,
creating a genuine "race to the bottom" that will be discussed below.
Evidence of the uselessness of offering tax holidays in the zones is
supported by the realization that these benefits may be smaller than
they first appear. Much or all of the tax relief is taxed away by the
160 A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 38.
... For instance, in Malaysian FIZs no significant income tax was obtained until
1986, 14 years after the first industries were established, because of a mixed regime of
tax holidays and other fiscal incentives. See ESCAP/UNCTC JOINT UNIT ON TRANS-
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 39, at 26.
162 Note, Export Processing Zones, supra note 136, at 483.
163 UNCTAD, EPFZs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 81, at 25. For a
study on the significance of tax holidays, see Lim, Fiscal Incentives and Direct Foreign
Investment in Less Developed Countries, 19 J. DEV. STUD. 207 (1983).
I For instance, Senegal offers tax exemption until 1999, and Egypt offers an
unlimited period. See J. CURRIE, THE GROWING ROLE OF EPZs, supra note 22, at
22.
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home country of the foreign investor, unless there is a tax-sparing
treaty between the home and the host country or profits are reinvested
in the subsidiary. 165 Tax-sparing agreements are bilateral treaties al-
lowing both host and home countries reasonably to benefit from taxes
paid by TNCs. In the absence of such agreements, most home countries
offer transnational investors only a partial tax-credit, which allows
them to charge a portion of the tributes paid to foreign governments for
operations abroad against their world-wide tax liability. 66
Some evidence suggests that developing countries may benefit from
a low-rate income tax upon zone operations without losing the attrac-
tiveness of low-cost manufacturing. It may be argued that TNCs are
normally able to reduce or even avoid taxable profits, and consequently
income taxes, through the mechanism of transfer pricing."8 7 However,
since FIZs are usually low-tax locations, tariff payments are not rele-
vant for customs-free zone operations, and exchange controls do not ap-
ply in most zones, the actual risk of transfer pricing to host countries
seems significantly low in zone manufacturing, even in the case of verti-
cally integrated industries.'6
3.2.5 Incentive Measures: A Race to the Bottom
Some years ago, William Cary published a highly controversial
article on the phenomenon that occurred in U.S. corporate law during
the first decades of this century. At that time, several states in search of
new sources of revenues entered a "race to the bottom" by offering
more favorable and "enabling" corporate statutes to attract the lucra-
16' As Lessard and Hansen put it, in some cases tax relief simply ends up being a
transfer of resources from the developing country's treasury to the home country's trea-
sury, providing no incentive at all to the investor. See Lessard & Hansen, Host Govern-
ment Regulations and Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment, in 1 NEGOTIATING
FOREIGN INVESTMENTS: A MANUAL FOR THE THIRD WORLD 3.1B 11-12 (R. Hel-
lawell & D. Wallace eds. 1982).
16 For a survey of home-countries' tax credits for income taxes paid abroad, see
Anthoine, Provisions in Tax Laws of Developed Countries Bearing Upon Private Di-
rect Investment in Developing Countries, in UNITED STATES TAXATION AND DEVEL-
OPING COUNTmiEs 43 (R. Hellawell ed. 1980).
167 Transfer pricing occurs when the accounting price at which an intra-firm
transaction takes place differs from the price that would prevail in an arm's length
market. Transfer pricing provides the company with the chance to reduce its global tax
liability by transferring accounting profits to low-tax countries, to reduce ad valorem
tariff payments by understating the value of imports, and to avoid exchange controls by
disguising capital transfers as expenditure flows. See M. CASSON, supra note 95, at 17.
"68 As transfer pricing is a problem both to developed and developing countries,
the latter should take advantage of recent developments in foreign trade laws and tax
policies of the former, which increase the possibility of controlling and regulating trans-
fer pricing, through the application of methods for determining arm's length reference
values. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (West Supp. 1988).
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tive business of incorporation. Delaware succeeded in achieving domi-
nance by virtue of its liberal and tolerant Corporate Act, becoming
"both the sponsor and the victim of a system contributing to the deteri-
oration of corporate standards." ' 9 Something similar to the U.S. expe-
rience is happening today in the foreign investment area. As the attrac-
tiveness of foreign investment grows, as the competition for that
investment becomes more global, and as capital supply diminishes, the
specter of "foreign investment wars" looms ever larger. 7 ' Arrival at the
bottom, where host country benefits are imperceptible, seems to be the
predictable outcome of this unreasonable race.
The investment wars are readily noticeable in FIZs, where incen-
tive measures are considered to be part of the concept.' According to
UNCTAD, this competition tends to be heavy, and as a result "there
seems to be a tendency to provide increasingly attractive fiscal and fi-
nancial incentives."'1 72 Although, as discussed above, investors see cer-
tain incentives as secondary, countries seem to believe that it would be
unwise not to offer such incentives if they are available elsewhere.
Under these circumstances, the criteria when designing an incentive
package are no longer what the country needs to offer in order to at-
tract industrial investment, but what the other zones are offering to
potential investors. It is a question of competitiveness, rather than an
inquiry into the country's needs and relative advantages.
Several risks arise as a consequence of this race to the bottom. The
most obvious is the danger of overstepping the frequently unpredictable
boundary between net gains and losses.' 73 From the macro perspective
of third world countries as a whole, it has been argued that competition
in providing incentives for exports "would merely result in the transfer
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 666 (1974). For a more recent discussion on the subject, see Fischel, The
"Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's
Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913 (1982).
170 See Encarnation & Wells, Sovereignty en garde: Negotiating with Foreign In-
vestors, 39 INT'L ORG. 47, 48 (1985).
'71 As one author puts it, "there is now severe competition to attract foreign in-
vestment by offering a package of inducements through free trade zones." Karunaratne,
supra note 29, at 220.
17 UNCTAD, EPFZs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 81, at 6. This
statement should, nevertheless, be compared with a previous report by the same inter-
national organization, suggesting that an "investment war" between zones is not likely
to occur because the investment decisions of foreign firms seem to be based primarily
upon more fundamental factors than removable government incentives. See UNCTAD,
INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS, supra note 57, at 24.
173 It has been reported, for example, that "because of growing competition the
countries concerned are moving towards extremely liberal investment codes . . .[that]
run counter to any effort. . . in the direction of improving social legislation and work-
ing conditions generally." A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 58.
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of resources from the developing to the developed countries without
necessarily increasing the overall level of such exports from the devel-
oping countries."' 7 Moreover, given the reported mobility of zone in-
dustries, the danger of relocation of existing firms to lower-cost sites
promising of increasingly better and more effective incentives ought to
be considered.
175
Policy-makers in developing countries may reasonably question
whether a country not willing to participate in this race may success-
fully operate an FIZ. There is empirical evidence suggesting an affirm-
ative answer, although it refers to countries enjoying or having enjoyed
particularly favorable circumstances. One of these is Taiwan, a country
that imposes several restrictions on foreign investors. For instance, for-
eign investors must have no adverse effects on hinterland industries,
export all their products, invest a minimum of $1.5 million, and include
at least twenty-five percent local inputs.Y76 Despite these restrictions,
Taiwan has succeeded in attracting a substantial amount of foreign
investments.
177
In recent years, concern about foreign investment wars has in-
creased considerably. A few proposals for stopping the race have been
presented, the feasibility of which will be further discussed in the last
part of this study. Commentators such as Cable and Murkherjee have
insisted that the best way to minimize the costs of such competition is to
establish coordinated incentive policies to reduce the extent of competi-
tive bidding for investment.
17
3.2.6 The Question of Appropriate Technology
Transfer of technology is a particularly delicate issue when ana-
lyzing transnational investment in developing countries. Host govern-
ments may reasonably expect to benefit from the know-how of indus-
trial investors. This would allow the host country to learn by doing
and, ultimately, to undertake industrial production with local resources.
The conflict arises when such expectations confront the legitimate in-
terest of TNCs in retaining their industrial knowledge.
Evidence suggests that this conflict is somewhat less significant in
I74 UNCTAD, INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS, supra note 57, at 5.
17 See UNCTAD, EPFZs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 81, at 28-29.
178 See Jayawardena, supra note 7, at 430.
17 A similar situation occurred in Mexico where the application in the FIZs of
tax and labor laws in force all over the country has not deterred foreign investors from
setting up enmasse in the zones. See, e.g., Note, Mexico's Maquiladora Program,
supra note 151, at 128-35.
178 Cable & Mukherjee, supra note 93, at 98.
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the context of foreign investments in FIZs. There are several reasons
that explain this phenomenon. One is that transfer of technology itself
is only a marginal aim of developing nations when establishing zones.
On the other hand, developing countries are increasingly aware of the
fact that most zone investors are vertically integrated assembling
plants. 1 9 Technically sophisticated pre-assembly phases usually remain
located in the home countries.1" Another factor influencing the rela-
tively low interest of developing countries in encouraging transfer of
technology in the zones is that the aim of promoting employment im-
plies a preference for labor-intensive operations, usually tied to low-
tech and standardized production of goods in the mature phase of their
life-cycle.
There is a separate issue of technology use in the zones that pol-
icy-makers have been facing for several years: that of the "appropriate"
technology." In a 1979 essay, Gustav Ranis emphasized that choosing
appropriate technology means selecting both production and products in
relation to the capabilities and objectives of a given society at a given
stage of its development.' 82 Accordingly, third world countries should
give priority to the use of technology that is consistent with the aims
constituting the rationale of the zones at a given time. If employment
generation and foreign exchange earnings are the main concerns, it is
dear that, ceteris paribus, labor-intensive technologies will be pre-
ferred, for they create more employment while saving foreign currency
spent on capital goods.'
17' For instance, the Regulations of the Customs Law of Mexico define a "maqui-
ladora" (i.e., an enterprise operating in Mexican free perimeters) as a "company, indi-
vidual or establishment, service, or any other kind of in-bond program approved and
registered with the competent authority, engaged in the transformation, assembly or
repair of merchandise or raw materials originating abroad, and temporarily im-
ported to be returned abroad" (emphasis added). Note, Mexico's Maquiladora Pro-
gram, supra note 151, at 110 n.1.
... This general rule may, in fact, have certain exceptions, as has reportedly oc-
curred in Mexico, where "[t]he RCA plant in Ciudad Ju~rez operates the most ad-
vanced computer-run machinery of the firm's operations worldwide." Meissner, supra
note 83, at 261-62.
.1 Julio Cortes has defined appropriate technology "as a body of technological
solutions and knowledge of any kind or level that will favor the effective solution of
specific problems within a given context and that will lead to a different way of think-
ing and acting." See Cortes, Appropiate Technology: Obstacles and Strategies, in IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC ORDER 175 (J. Lozoya & R. Green eds. 1981).
182 See Ranis, Appropriate Technology in the Context of Redirecting Industrial
Development Strategy: Concepts and Policies, in U.N. INDUS. DEv. ORG., CONCEP-
TUAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR APPROPRIATE INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY 50
(1979).
183 An International Labour Office study found that it may be counter-productive
to compel TNCs to choose labor-intensive technologies, as they will select them anyway
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Finally, it is interesting to note that experience corroborates that
countries' technological priorities in individual zones may change with
time. Such a change has occurred in relatively industrialized countries
such as Taiwan, where Science Parks have now been established to
promote high-tech transnational investments in special-purpose
FMZs.""
3.2.7 Zone Location and Regional Development
An overview of FIZs in third world nations reveals that most
countries select relatively underdeveloped regions to establish zones, be-
lieving that increased economic activity will entail a boom effect in the
economy. 85 The theory that regional development could be promoted
through industrial areas was widespread in developing countries and,
along with the concept of industrial estates, was closely tied to the ori-
gin of FIZs . 86 An Indian economist observed that dispersal of indus-
tries on a regional basis has been regarded as fruitful and recommended
that the policy of decentralization of industrial activities be adopted by
countries trying to bring economically stable and regionally balanced
industrial development.'
Economic activity in the zones may hasten the integration of un-
derdeveloped or remote regions into the cultural and economic main-
stream of the country."' 8 However, unequal results have been obtained
in achieving regional progress through zone operations. Success has fre-
quently depended on the potential linkages with the regional economy,
although arguably the mere installation or improvement of certain pub-
lic services that accompany the establishment of an FIZ yields benefits
for the surrounding area.
Zones have been regarded as regional economic boosters in coun-
if those technologies are commercially competitive. See generally INT'L LABOUR OFF.,
TECHNOLOGY CHOICE AND EMPLOYMENT GENERATION BY MULTINATIONAL EN-
TERPRISES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1984).
18 See J. CURRIE, EPZs IN THE 1980s, supra note 20, at 9.
185 The promotion of regional development through industrial decentralization is
considered by several countries to be one of the principal considerations for establishing
a zone. As to China, it "regarded its Export Processing Zones as comprehensive zones
aimed at promoting regional development." ESCAP/UNCTC JOINT UNIT ON
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 39, at 16.
186 "Once an industrial estate is set up in a given locality, therefore, having regard
to such factors as population density, present and potential resources, trade prospects of
the surrounding area, it gets the potentiality of serving as an industrial nucleus or
economic base for the community as a whole." K. BANDYOPADHAYA, INDUSTRIALIZA-
TION THROUGH INDUSTRIAL ESTATES: A PATTERN OF ECONOMIC DECENTRALIZA-
TION 16 (1969).
187 R.K. BHARTI, INDUSTRIAL ESTATES IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 14 (1978).
188 See Note, Foreign Trade Zones in Latin America, supra note 7, at 120.
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tries such as Malaysia, Mexico, Haiti, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and
Brazil. 189 Notwithstanding the general rule that zones foster regional
economic booms, there have been important exceptions in countries
such as Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay, where the local impact of the
zones has been rather insignificant. Even in relatively successful FIZs,
such as those in Colombia, it has been reported that regional impact
has been quite irrelevant and that "the zones do not seem to have a
significant potentiality as instruments for regional development." ' l
3.2.8 Extraterritoriality: A Country Within A Country?
FIZs are deemed to enjoy an "extraterritorial" status, i.e., a juridi-
cal fiction that exempts activities held in a designated area from the
application of rules and regulations in force in the rest of the country.
Several factors appear to justify such a qualification, the most relevant
being the customs-free character of the zones, according to which "for
all intents and purposes movements to and from free trade zones and
domestic tariff areas . . . constitute movements between two coun-
tries."19 The extraterritoriality is reinforced by the fact that the estab-
lishment of an FIZ is frequently complemented by the creation of a
relatively autonomous public entity to governing industrial and com-
mercial activities within the zones.
On the other hand, FIZs are usually considered to be policy en-
claves, in which the government can implement policies not necessarily
consistent with those applied in the rest of the country. In fact, the
zones have been regarded by some countries, such as India, as instru-
ments to implement policies designed to isolate the export sector from
the local economy, based on the concept of import substitution. Simi-
larly, China and other countries have found in the zones an opportu-
nity to open their doors to foreign investment, without altering the do-
mestic economic scheme.
A factor reinforcing the notion of extraterritoriality is the special
incentive measures offered within the zones. Ad hoc tax and labor re-
gimes create an important distinction between the two legal frameworks
under which zone industries and domestic manufacturers operate. The
I'l A psychological impact has been reported in the Manaus FIZ in Brazil. Re-
portedly, the collective consciousness in a region "formerly accustomed not to harbor
grand hopes and to live harshly" is of non-measurable value as an impetus for regional
development. R. DE OLIVEIRA PONTES, ZONA FRANCA: FATOR DE DESENvoLvI-
MENTO PARA A AMAZONIA OCIDENTAL 9 (1977), cited in Note, Foreign Trade Zones
in Latin America, supra note 7, at 136.
190 Giraldo, Prada & Turriago, supra note 34, at 47.
191 Jayawardena, supra note 7, at 428.
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dissimilarity is even greater in those countries where dispute resolution
agreements, submitting to international arbitration any controversy in-
volving zone investors, have been signed. Sri Lanka is a good example
of such a situation, in which domestic investors may not be sued in
ordinary domestic courts.192
But extraterritoriality is not only a legal status. Other factors, such
as physical boundaries, internal policing devices, few linkages with the
local economy, and the dominance of TNCs, reinforce the appearance
of zones as foreign enclaves. "Since assembly production is often clus-
tered in compact and politically discrete free manufacturing zones, it is
criticized as an enclave of foreign interests."19
Developing countries have faced several problems as a conse-
quence of the extraterritoriality of the zones. Some are primarily legal,
including the inconvenience of running two distinct legal systems with
rather different policies in force."' The problem is particularly acute
because some basic principles orienting the economic policies of most
developing countries are inconsistent with the zone concept itself or
with the aims of the country when establishing FIZs. There are also
social problems that emerge as a consequence of the country-within-a-
country status. For example, cultural alienation has been reported in
the Mexican-U.S. border region, supposedly originating from the in-
dustrial "yankeezation" of zone operations." 5 Reportedly, when off-
shore activities are "seen from the distant capital, Mexico City, the bor-
der region appears more nearly integrated with the United States than
with Mexico." '98
Finally, one author has underlined the fact that unequal economic
development between the zones and the surrounding areas may consti-
tute a source of social problems, 197 a fact frequently exacerbated by the
'2 Sri Lanka is a signatory to the 1965 Convention on Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of States. See J. CURRIE, EPZs IN THE 1980S,
supra note 20, at 136.
193 J. GRUNWALD & K. FLAMM, supra note 101, at 229.
19" A good illustration of this problem, in a developed country may be found in
decisions involving U.S. FIZs, where jurisdictional uncertainty on the application of
federal and state laws has been reported. For instance, one New York federal court
held U.S. patent law applicable to zone-based transactions, G.D. Searle & Co. v. Byron
Chemical Co., 223 F. Supp. 172, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), whereas a New York state
court held that local regulations on liquor trade do not apply in Foreign Trade Zones.
During v. Valente, 267 App. Div. 383, 46 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1944). See generally Bader,
supra note 17, at 246-254; Note, Foreign Trade Zones, supra note 14, at 739-748.
195 See Meissner, supra note 83, at 261.
196 J. GRUNWALD & K. FLAMM, supra note 101, at 230.
197 See Utrecht, Gains and Losses in 25 Years of Export-Oriented Industrializa-
tion in South and Southeast Asia, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND EXPORT
ORIENTED INDUSTRIALIZATION 156 (E. Utrecht ed. 1985).
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presence of foreign corporations, managers and technicians. "Appalling
social conditions caused by unequal economic development, have be-
come sources of social unrest and upheaval in areas where impoverish-
ment has created problems of life or death." ' Despite the drama of
such a statement, it is not difficult to imagine that industrial-enclave
operations in traditionally poor and relatively underdeveloped regions
may in fact cause social disturbances.
3.2.9 Tea for Two? Local Entrepreneurs and the Zones
Some developing countries still see FIZs as a game that only host
governments and foreign investors can play. However, the recent his-
tory of several zones has shown that domestic investors may successfully
participate, particularly through international subcontracting, in joint
ventures or export-oriented free-lance industries. Experiences in coun-
tries such as Colombia, India, and more recently South Korea, have
shown that positive effects may arise from allowing domestic invest-
ments in the zones. Among the benefits are an expected increase in
linkages with the domestic economy, acquisition of industrial and mar-
keting expertise at international standards, development of local entre-
preneurship and management skills, and an increase in foreign ex-
change earnings that will remain in the country.19 '
There are various other factors driving developing countries' gov-
ernments not only to allow local investments, but also to encourage do-
mestic participation. A preference by foreign investors to engage local
businesspeople as partners in joint ventures has been reported.200 An
anticipated contraction of capital flows from industrial countries may
be another consideration for garnering local participation; local invest-
ments are now permitted even in countries that originally banned them.
This is the case with Pakistan, which recently shifted from a 100%-
foreign-owned capital requirement to encouraging domestic participa-
tion through joint-ventures.
3.2. 10 Zone Exports and Neo-Protectionism
As discussed in the preceding sections, transnational investments in
FIZs take place primarily through assembling subsidiaries, vertically-
198 Id.
199 Charles Oman lists other benefits that apply in particular to subcontracting
and joint ventures, such as reducing foreign investor's scope for transfer pricing, con-
trolling absorption of local savings or external indebtedness, favoring the development
of local technological capacity, etc. See C. OMAN, supra note 65, at 96.
2100 See J. CURRIE, EPZs IN THE 1980s, supra note 20, at 45.
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integrated companies, international subcontractors and local export in-
dustries. Most of these forms of investment fall into the category of so-
called off-shore manufacturing. The concept of off-shore manufacturing
encompasses those industrial operations that TNCs relocate in develop-
ing countries in order to lower costs of production, although their out-
put is primarily intended to be exported to the TNC's home country or
to other industrial countries. The typical off-shore transnational inves-
tor is a business organization originally wholly-based in a developed
nation, which has been forced to move one or more stages of its indus-
trial process, usually labor-intensive stages, to a third-world location in
search of lower production costs. The motivation for this type of move
is due primarily to factors such as increasing competition from foreign
products in the home market or the fact that a given product has
reached the "mature" phase of its life-cycle.
Developed countries have been indirectly supporting vertically in-
tegrated manufacturing, and thereby zone production, by limiting the
application of tariffs to value added abroad. In addition, off-shore in-
vestors have been taking advantage of preferential access to industrial-
country markets, granted to manufactured imports from developing
countries through international trade arrangements such as the Genera-
lized System of Preferences' 1 or the Lom6 Convention. 0 2
In recent years, however, much concern has been raised in devel-
oped countries over the negative effects of encouraging the relocation
abroad of labor-intensive stages of production. Phenomena such as the
so-called "export of jobs" to third world nations, the deterioration of
the balance of payments in important industries, and the loss of inter-
national competitiveness through the leakage of technology203 have been
identified to support these claims, primarily by workers' unions and
industry associations.' 4 Unfortunately, political pressure exercised by
these groups has resulted in an overestimation of the effects of manu-
factured imports from developing countries on the economy of indus-
trial countries, and a defensive attitude has taken in the shape of a new
01 The Generalized System of Preferences was originally introduced in Geneva at
the first UNCTAD in 1964, when developing nations realized that the equal-footing
negotiations and arrangements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) were nothing but an inconvenient illusion, and the necessity of a preferential
treatment for third world exports was recognized. See Economic and Social Questions,
1964 U.N.Y.B. 195, at 200-01, U.N. Sales No. 65.1.1.
'0' Lom6 Convention, Feb. 28, 1975, Africa-Caribbean-Pacific-European Eco-
nomic Community, O.J. DUR. COMM. (No. L24) 1 (1976).
203 See J. GRUNWALD & K. FLAMM, supra note 101, at 8.
2" For a recent example of this trend, see Maquiladora Impact on U.S. Jobs and
Trade Competition with Japan: Hearing before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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wave of protectionism that characterizes this stage of international trade
in manufactures.
Ernst Utrecht has pointed out that developed countries' protection-
ist policies constitute one of the most serious threats to the very exis-
tence of FIZs in developing countries.2"5 As the success of the zones is
closely related to the expansion of off-shore manufacturing in the con-
text of the new international division of labor, any measure that indus-
trial countries take against the latter will directly affect the former. The
irony of this situation is that the negative effects of off-shore manufac-
turing upon the developed countries' economies are likely to be mini-
mal, even with respect to unemployment, admittedly a legitimate con-
cern. Conversely, industrial countries' gains, in lowering costs for
consumers through overseas production and allowing certain industries
to remain competitive, are quite significant.
The fact is that neo-protectionist measures against zone exports
are seriously threatening the future of FIZs in developing countries,
while such measures are not likely to solve any problems in mature
economies. In any event, developed countries should recognize that in
many cases "the alternative to export-platform production is not the
retention of production in the mature economy, but the transfer of the
entire industry" to a third world location.206
3.2.11 Export Orientation and Access to the Host Market
Evaluating foreign investments in low-income developing coun-
tries, Cable and Mukherjee suggest that purely export-oriented invest-
ment is difficult to attract and that countries with large internal mar-
kets could offer zone products some degree of access, with or without
full payment of duties, as a means to render the prospect of investing in
their FIZs more appealing. According to these authors, one major rea-
son for the almost negligible foreign presence in the Kandla FIZ in
India is the virtual lack of access to the domestic market.207 Other
countries with relatively large domestic markets such as Brazil, Mexico,
China, Korea, and Taiwan provide incentives to firms to set up in the
zones by allowing foreign investors to sell part of their output in the
local market. The Chinese experience demonstrates the interest of
TNCs in entering traditionally closed markets through zone manufac-
turing, as foreign investors are seeking and gaining access to local sales
205 Utrecht, supra note 197, at 147.
206 See M. CASSON, supra note 95, at 6.
20. Cable & Mukherjee, supra note 93, at 100.
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rather than concentrating on exports.2"8
The decision to allow FIZs' products to be commercialized in the
local market is not an easy one. It raises the dilemma of reaching a
balance between the interest of the country in attracting foreign invest-
ments and the need to protect domestic industries. Another conflict ap-
pears between the objective of generating foreign currency, inherent to
the establishment of FIZs, and the potential local consumption of im-
port-intensive goods produced in the zones.
Evidence suggests that access to the host market, although not an
ordinary feature of FIZs, may constitute an additional inducement for
prospective investors, particularly for zone-manufactured products
which do not compete with domestic manufactures. Equally important,
access to the home market may turn out to be a convenient way to
substitute imports. In Sri Lanka, for instance, a glass manufacturer
was allowed to sell fifty percent of its production domestically, even
though the general rule is to permit no more than ten percent of local
sales.2" 9
Foreign investors may also be interested in investing in developing
countries which participate in extended-market regimes, such as those
of the Andean Group, the Arab Common Market, or CARICOM, in
order to be entitled to freely commercialize zone products in countries
other than the host nation. 10 Similarly, countries which have special
tariff arrangements for exporting manufactures to third markets could
replicate such incentives, if they were to include zone products in their
quotas, provided that certain requirements of minimun local content
were met.2
In summary, the regulatory potential of authorizing local sales, or
of providing foreign investors with preferential access to regional or
third markets, has gone generally unexplored. Indeed, this field may
offer an important feature to help make the zones more attractive and
profitable, in accordance with the country's needs and potentials.
208 Id. at 104.
219 See A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 39.
210 For instance, article 36 of the Colombian Free Zones Statute establishes that
industrial companies installed in the Free Zones may benefit from the Free Trade
Program of Andean Pact, provided that they comply with the applicable regulations of
the Cartagena Agreement. Law No. 109 of 1985, art. 36, reprinted in COLOMBIA
EXPORTA, supra note 35, at 5.
.11 This has reportedly occurred in countries such as Sri Lanka that enjoy com-
modities' export-quotas to developed countries but do not produce enough manufactures
to fill them. Producers from the newly industrialized nations have been investing in
those countries merely to take advantage of their unused quotas. See Jayawardena,
supra note 7, at 441.
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3.2.12 Political Instability and Footloose Industries
According to recent surveys, political stability ranks among the
most significant elements that TNCs evaluate when considering an in-
vestment decision in a third world country.212 A 1983 study suggests
that TNCs operating in developing countries carefully analyze the po-
litical environment in making their business decisions. 2 13 A complete
evaluation of the political climate through the investors' eyes would en-
compass not only the degree of vulnerability of the country's status quo,
but also the attitudes of the government and of the population vis-a-vis
foreign investments. Other important considerations are the tradition of
respect for generally accepted principles of international law and, more
generally, the reliability of the country's legal system.
In addition to the well-known political risks faced by transnational
investors in developing nations, other elements may enhance their risks
in the context of zone investments. Political vulnerability seems to be
considerably higher due to the exceptional regime of the zones. The
"foreign enclave" status characteristic of FIZs may also turn into a pos-
sible source of social conflicts and political questioning. Moreover, the
fact that host countries' benefits from the zones frequently fall far be-
low expectations could create an adverse political climate for zone
operations.
These and other risks are familiar to transnational investors, and
therefore host governments have attempted to neutralize the potentially
pernicious effects by granting special legal safeguards to zone produc-
ers. Countries such as South Korea and Sri Lanka have signed multi-
lateral and bilateral agreements with home-country governments to
guarantee zone investments against nationalizations and to submit to
arbitration any dispute between zone authorities and foreign
investors.2" 4
Nonetheless, political risks may be mitigated considerably by the
simple production structure that characterizes zone industries. Since
vertically-integrated transnational enterprises split their manufacturing
activities between several countries, their overall exposure to risk is
lowered relatively. Thus, diversifying production among countries is an
explicit strategy of TNCs for reducing the risks of political and eco-
212 For instance, a linkage has been found between the political instability in Pan-
ama since late 1987 and a decrease in the interest of potential investors in visiting the
Colon FIZs. See S. Salcedo, supra note 7, at 54.
21I See J. Austin and D. Yoffie, Political Forecasting as a Management Tool 1
(1983) (unpublished paper, available in Harvard Business School Library).
214 See A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 3.
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nomic disturbances. 21 5
The basic infrastructure usually provided by the host country in
FIZs minimizes the installation costs to the company, reducing its ex-
posure to political instability. "The preference for relatively small
plants in EPZs, the low investment cost per workplace, the use of rela-
tively inexpensive and simple equipment, the lack of backward linkages
and the availability of standard factory buildings in nearly all zones
enable companies to relocate production from one country to another
comparatively quickly. ' 216 Mobility of zone enterprises is encouraged
by the harmful competition among FIZs in developing countries. As the
investment portfolio is relatively broad and the disinvestment costs are
rather low, TNCs use their footloose character both as a defensive tool
to avoid political risks and as a permanent threat to obtain better incen-
tives from host countries.
The more unstable a country's political situation is, the more
likely it is that the company will be permanently prepared to move.
However, the mobility of zone companies should not be overestimated.
It may be observed that once a company is established in a zone it will
leave it only after determining that the operation is uneconomical or
under extraordinarily precarious circumstances. Gases in which firms
have left FIZs overnight are considered exceptional.
4. LAW AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR A ZONE STRATEGY
Throughout this study, several problems arising from the imple-
mentation of the concept of FIZs in the third world have been identi-
fied. In most cases, such problems have prevented developing countries
from maximizing the benefits they could have obtained from operation
of the zones, or have even turned what could have been a relatively
important tool for economic development into a useless waste of re-
sources. The last section of this article suggests policy guidelines and
legal mechanisms that third world countries could adopt to mitigate, or
eventually eliminate, certain problems that may arise from the estab-
lishment and operation of FIZs. Several such legal and policy instru-
ments have already been successfully adopted by one or more countries.
Others have not yet been tested in the context of individual zones but
are thought to be potentially useful for solving certain specific problems
that FIZs are facing today. None of these instruments is supposed to be
applicable in all zones, but they all should be considered by developing
nations engaged in adapting the zone concept to meet their own needs
215 See J. GRUNWALD & K. FLAMM, supra note 101, at 218.
210 UNCTAD, EPFZs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 81, at 6.
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and possibilities.
Of course, it must be borne in mind that even a well designed and
efficiently operated FIZ is far from being a panacea. A country must
carefully evaluate the economic feasibility of a zone and its potential
social and economic impact before seriously considering an appropriate
strategy for zone development. Conducting a detailed social cost-benefit
analysis in advance to evaluate the pros and cons of setting up a zone in
a particular location is advisable. All policy recommendations discussed
below are suggested with the assumption that the outcome of such an
evaluation has shown the viability of establishing an FIZ in the con-
cerned country.
At this point, it should be remembered that the success of a partic-
ular FIZ does not depend solely upon a positive evaluation of its eco-
nomic feasibility or on an adequately structured and implemented law
and policy framework. Several social, economic, and political factors,
both internal and external, may alter the circumstances, deciding the
zone's fate in unpredictable ways. Governments would be well advised
to follow closely any internal or external development that might affect
the operation of the zones and to evaluate, in view of the particular
circumstances, whether a variation in individual zone policies should be
implemented.
4.1 General Guidelines for a Zone Strategy
Policy recommendations must always be addressed to particular
issues. As a matter of fact, policies should always be tested for their
possible effects in a particular scenario. However, one can recognize
certain general patterns that might lead policy-makers to respond to
individual policy questions more adequately. This section attempts to
suggest such guidelines in the context of designing and structuring poli-
cies and regulations for more efficient operation of FIZs.
This study has revealed some structural features that developing
countries may find useful to consider when drafting particular rules to
be applied in FIZs. The first is that zone policies should be designed
and structured only after identifying the aims that the country intends
to accomplish through the operation of the zones, considering its own
economic potential and comparative advantages. The country should
rank these goals according to its own needs and priorities, and only
after that should it structure a zone strategy.
Another important point made evident throughout this study is
that FIZs, despite their conceptual simplicity, imply in their implemen-
tation the convergence of various individual policies-on employment,
taxes, and foreign exchange, for example-that will apply exclusively
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within the bounded area. As the development strategy of the country
may be affected by or may overlap with such zone policies, it is quite
obvious that the ideal performance of the zones will not be attained
unless the overall development strategy of the country is considered
when drafting individual zone regulations.
The preceding statement raises the issue of extraterritoriality. The
extraterritorial status of FIZs is nothing but a legal fiction created to
justify or to facilitate the adoption of exceptional policies and legal
norms that will apply only within the zones. The significance of extra-
territoriality should not be overestimated by developing countries. It is
nothing but an artificial tool for regulation, and being such, it may
occasionally be disregarded in the event that it becomes an obstacle to
the attainment of developmental goals, or if it compromises the coun-
try's rule of law. There are, of course, certain advantages that the
country gets from the exceptional status of FIZs, the main one being
that zone policies need not be consistent with the overall economic poli-
cies in force in the rest of the country. The natural limit on this license
is that zone regulations should never contradict the country's overall
developmental objectives or endanger the consistency of the country's
public policy.
Because several zone policies will be different from those in force
in the rest of the country, efforts should be made to effect policies
which are both comprehensive and coherent. Even though most policies
applying in the FIZ will be the same as those in force in the rest of the
country, it would prove valuable to approach zone policy-making as a
separate set of policies, in the sense that the outcome should be a sys-
tematic body of rules and regulations that will apply exclusively in the
zones. For the same reason, zone policies should be particularly uncom-
plicated and stable, especially when the country's goal is to attract a
steady flow of long-term investments. Again, the exceptional policies
applying in FIZs, incentive measures in particular, are likely to gener-
ate skepticism among both foreign and domestic companies. Easily re-
movable regulations and dearly inconvenient concessions may generate
doubt concerning the stability of zone policies and may have a negative
impact on potential investors.
A relevant lesson to be gained from the past experience of FIZs is
that governments engaged in structuring them should always consider
those trends and developments in international trade and investment
that may affect the zone's operation. In fact, external political and eco-
nomic factors may dramatically alter the zone's scenario and encourage
the adoption of one individual policy instead of another.
Finally, evidence suggests the advisability of centralizing both the
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design and execution of zone regulations. This goal could be attained
through the creation of a relatively autonomous zone authority to work
on such zone policy design and execution. Centralization in the deci-
sion-making process entails standardization of criteria and avoids in-
consistencies in policy structure and implemention. Moreover, centrali-
zation might facilitate the operation of zone enterprises and lower their
administrative costs, as they would have to deal only with one govern-
ment agency.
4.2 Law and Policy Recommendations for a Better Performance of
FIZs
4.2.1 Zone Strategy and Industrial Development
The role that FIZs can play in the quest for industrialization is
still unclear for most developing nations. In terms of industrial develop-
ment, what can a country expect from establishing a zone? Should the
industrialization goals be confined to setting up manufacturing plants
within the bounded industrial area? Is it sensible to expect a broader
impact in the whole country or at least in a selected region? Although
the answers to these questions are necessarily related to the actual in-
dustrial potential of the country, some evidence suggests that the impact
of the zone on industrialization may have a wider ambit than merely
being an outward-oriented industrial estate.
In order to maximize the zone's effects on industrialization, a de-
veloping country should see zone industrial policy as a branch of its
overall industrialization scheme instead of looking at zone policy as a
separate strategy. Zone industrial policy should be coordinated with the
country's industrialization strategy, and FIZs must be considered an-
other instrument to accomplish the industrialization goals of the coun-
try. This is not to say that FIZs are only feasible in the context of an
export-oriented scheme, or that zone policy must necessarily be consis-
tent with the individual industrialization policies in force in the rest of
the country, as exceptional regimes will often be in force within the
bounded area.
One practical consequence of such a macro perspective on the
zones is related to the selection of investment projects, technologies, and
products to be encouraged in the zones. A coordinated approach to zone
industrial policy would lead the country to prioritize in FIZs those
projects that are more likely to accomplish the overall industrialization
objectives. A macro perspective may also influence priorities regarding
the type of investors the country is willing to attract, namely, foreign
subsidiaries or branches, joint ventures, or local enterprises engaged in
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subcontracting or export activities.
The zones' impact on industrialization will definitely be increased
by encouraging backward and forward linkages with the domestic econ-
omy. Backward linkages might be increased through a minimum-local-
content policy that could be implemented by fixing a reasonable mini-
mum percentage of domestic inputs in zone products or through case-
by-case negotiations with zone investors, depending on the host govern-
ment's administrative capacities. The minimum-local-content require-
ment might be adjusted according to the destination of the companies'
production. For instance, higher local content might be required in do-
mestic-market-oriented industries.217 However, locally manufactured
inputs often do not reach the quality standards required in industrial-
country markets. The minimum-local-content rule might be achieved
by sponsoring or inducing temporary supervision by zone enterprises of
potential domestic suppliers' production. Such domestic industries
might also be induced via incentive measures to reach the standards of
quality required by zone enterprises.
Backward linkages may also be increased by encouraging partici-
pation of local entrepreneurs in the zones, through joint ventures, sub-
contracting, or free-lance export industries. Domestic investors will nat-
urally find it convenient to utilize domestic inputs, particularly when
they are acceptable by international standards. Local participation may
also serve to develop export-oriented domestic entrepreneurship and to
increase net foreign exchange earnings, two features that have already
been discussed above.
Although FIZs usually are related to export-oriented schemes,
countries may find it convenient to allow zone production limited access
to the domestic market as a means to increase forward linkages with
the domestic economy and/or to substitute imports. Competition
through forward linkages may contribute to raising the quality stan-
dards of local industries, although it also risks jeopardizing the subsis-
tence of formerly protected, inefficient domestic industries. A country
might evaluate the advisability of granting zone producers access to the
domestic market on a case-by-case basis, considering in its analysis both
the convenience of increasing forward industrial linkages and the feasi-
bility of import substitution. At the very least, the country must estab-
lish a local content requirement that would guarantee at least a neutral
.17 Similarly, a given value-added might be established to allow zone industries to
participate in export quotas granted to the country by developed nations through ex-
isting systems of tariff preferences. This possibility will be further discussed below,
when considering of the impact of FIZs on the country's foreign trade policy.
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balance-of-payments impact for each zone industry.218
Import-substitution may be an extremely important consideration
when evaluating the convenience of granting zone producers some ac-
cess to the domestic market, as well as when ranking investment
projects to be encouraged in the zones. In fact, the customs-free regime
characteristic of zone manufacturing and the incentive measures fre-
quently offered in the zones should result in comparatively lower pro-
duction costs than those for the domestic industries. This could make it
economically feasible to undertake production in the zones of goods for-
merly imported.
An interesting policy question that developing countries may face
when establishing an FIZ is whether domestic industries should be al-
lowed to move to the zone. There are certain pros and cons that policy
makers should consider before reaching a decision on the issue. Among
the latter, FIZs constitute a significant investment made under the as-
sumption that zone industries will create new jobs and additional in-
come for the country. Furthermore, the country will typically receive
considerably fewer benefits in customs duties and taxes from a zone
enterprise than those from a domestic industry. Nonetheless, the zones
may be an adequate place to relocate export industries, which normally
enjoy special regimes, in low-cost export platforms, thereby giving them
additional advantages to compete in the international market. This
would be particularly important for those enterprises that use a large
portion of imported inputs and in countries where production costs are
significantly higher outside the zones.
In any case, the costs of moving an enterprise to the zones should
also be considered. Countries may find an alternative in authorizing
export industries to operate as sub-zones or bonded manufacturing
warehouses, enjoying mutatis mutandis the same regime applicable to
zone enterprises. Sub-zones may also be extremely useful for those op-
erations that clearly are too large to be installed in the zones. The main
problem to be considered in adopting the sub-zone concept is that they
require an extensive and efficient system of control which is not likely
to be found in most developing countries and which generates addi-
tional administrative costs for the host nation.
As for the in-zone industrial policies, developing country govern-
ments should always bear in mind the existence of various forms of
investment likely to be found in FIZs, all of which have been discussed
in the first part of this essay. Those forms of investment are wholly-
""8 As discussed above, authorization of local sales may also be a very important
incentive to attract foreign investors, particularly in the case of countries with large
markets.
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owned subsidiaries, intra-firm assemblers, international subcontractors,
and free-lance local industries. It would prove valuable for zone policy-
makers to test the compatibility of every proposed zone policy with each
of these types of zone investors, in order to guarantee that zone regula-
tions will be appropriate and applicable to any and all zone
manufacturers.
At the same time, host countries may find it advisable to follow
closely those new trends and recent developments in transnational trade
and investment that are likely to affect the behavior of each of these
different types of zone investors. It may also be useful to consider the
advisability of formulating separate sets of rules for each of these
groups of investors in an effort to maximize benefits to be obtained
from FIZs.
4.2.2 Law and Employment Policy in FIZs
Formulating an employment policy for the zones is certainly a dif-
ficult task. Both the importance that developing countries assign to the
aim of generating employment and the fact that cheap labor is regarded
to be the most relevant consideration for transnational investors in FIZs
make it particularly difficult to reconcile the frequently conflicting in-
terests between employers and workers. This concern is exacerbated by
the fact that most developing countries suffer from chronic unemploy-
ment. Policy-makers frequently find themselves facing the dilemma of
either improving the standard of living of current workers or liberaliz-
ing labor regulations in order to attract new investments that will in
turn generate more employment. The rationale of developing countries
seems to be to protect the labor standards of zone workers to the extent
that they will not discourage potential investors from setting up in the
FIZ.
There are, of course, certain problems in labor relations that em-
ployment law and policy are clearly in no position to solve. These limi-
tations may be easily noticed when discussing the characteristics of the
zones' work forces. The preference of zone manufacturers for young,
inexperienced, and unmarried women is unlikely to be changed through
the adoption of specific policies to induce companies to alter the compo-
sition of their work force.219 Even if the country's concern is that the
"I The composition of FIZs' work forces seems to be related to a reported docility
of young female workers, insofar as the defense of their employment rights is con-
cerned. A zone entrepreneur in Bangladesh is quoted stating that women are willing to
work for as little as $13 a month and accept harsh conditions and long hours without
complaint: "'If I appoint 400 men workers they immediately start making union polit-
ics,' he said. 'Not the women.'" See Mydans, In Bangladesh Women Can't Go Home
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typical zone worker may be more subject to abuses, the protection
granted by the implementation of labor laws might be as far as the law
could go.
Something that developing countries should always consider when
structuring employment policies for FIZs is that the most relevant com-
parative advantage that the country may offer to transnational investors
is relatively cheap labor, which can materially lower a company's pro-
duction costs, thereby increasing its international competitiveness. Pol-
icy-makers should always bear in mind that the burden employment
rights will place on the enterprise's operational costs must not signifi-
cantly reduce the zone's relative advantage in labor costs. However,
cases of non-observance of international labor treaties and human
rights violations have been reported in the zones. Host countries should
realize that certain internationally accepted employment rights, not fre-
quently recognized in FIZs, are not considered critical by zone inves-
tors. A moderate minimum wage, reasonable hours, and annual holi-
days are some of the working conditions that transnational investors
would typically not even discuss. Labor policies allowing worker ex-
ploitation are thus not necessary to appeal to potential zone investors.
On the other hand, experience shows that foreign companies
would not expect certain employment rights to apply in FIZs, and,
therefore, these rights cannot be granted without the zone's losing some
attractiveness. Unionization, job security, and participation in corporate
governance have proven to be conflicting issues for zone enterprises.
This fact does not necessarily mean that those rights will never be
granted in the case of zone workers, but it highlights the challenge for
lawmakers to regulate labor in a way that would not diminish the
zones' attractiveness to foreign investors. Another important fact to con-
sider is that, although the suspension of certain labor and union regula-
tions is supposed to benefit investors, such suspension would not neces-
sarily constitute an advantage for zone enterprises. As wages paid to
zone workers are frequently low, poor labor conditions may generate a
hostile working environment that would repel, rather than attract, po-
tential investors.220
A particularly delicate matter for both zone companies and work-
ers is that of the employer's discretion to cancel at will an employee's
contract. Developing countries should realize that this point is fre-
quently considered to be non-negotiable by foreign enterprises, al-
Again, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1988, at 8, col. 4.
0 Commentators have pointed out that "in the case of a serious crisis the absence
of institutionalized mechanisms for concertation may provoke a brutal rupture of social
peace." See A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, supra note 3, at 34.
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though job security has been granted in some successful FIZs. In any
case, countries might be interested in trying various methods, such as
encouraging fixed-term employment contracts or establishing automatic
compensation for employees discharged without a good cause, to allevi-
ate the problem.
Regarding the number of jobs that a zone industry may generate,
it might be concluded that labor-intensive operations need not be in-
duced, as they constitute the largest number of industries in FIZs eve-
rywhere. The best way of increasing the total number of jobs generated
by zone activities is to maximize their potential macroeconomic effects
through increasing forward and backward linkages with the domestic
economy, not only with the service sector, but also with domestic
industries.
Finally, given the interest of third world countries in developing
local expertise in producing for the international market, they may also
be willing to induce participation of nationals in key managerial and
technical positions. Nevertheless, policy makers should be aware of the
fact that most zone enterprises are simply structured assembly plants
that need very few high-level employees. As most foreign companies
operating in the zones are vertically integrated, the relevant manage-
ment and technical decisions are ordinarily made by corporate head-
quarters, rather than by the local subsidiary. Thus, there seem to be
very few possibilities for generating jobs at the managerial level in FIZ
operations.
4,2.3 Tax Law and Policy in FIZs
Most zones are regarded as tax havens, as foreign companies may
receive income or own assets without paying the ordinary tax rates
upon them, or may simply enjoy tax holidays.221 A very important tax
policy implication of this study is that tax holidays need not be offered
to attract foreign investors to FIZs, or at least not to the extent that
they are granted in several countries. Various reasons have been
pointed out to support such a conclusion. One is that zone locations in
themselves offer a significant comparative advantage in production costs
vis-a-vis other places, so no additional substantial incentives are re-
quired to attract foreign companies. Moreover, tax credit and tax spar-
ing systems existing in several industrial countries make it useless to
grant local tax immunities, as zone profits will be taxed in the com-
pany's home country.
221 For an explanation of the pros and cons of tax havens, see Casanegra de Jant-
scher, Tax Havens Explained, 13 FIN. & DEv. 31 (March 1976).
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Several studies have concluded that a complete exemption from lo-
cal taxes does not significantly influence TNCs' investment decisions.
Furthermore, certain successful FIZs do not offer tax concessions at all,
yet do not lose their appeal to foreign investors. Some evidence suggests
that an acceptable regime for FIZs may include taxes to the extent that
they would not prevent potential investors from setting up in the zones.
On the other hand, it seems that the less complicated a tax regime is,
the less harmful it will be considered by manufacturing enterprises.
Hence, developing countries may consider imposing a low-rate income
tax on zone operations, in lieu of all other taxes applicable in the rest
of the country.
An alternative system would be to adopt a case-by-case regime
that considers the treatment of local taxes in the investor's home coun-
try, e.g., tax crediting or tax-sparing, when deciding whether or not to
tax its zone operations. Policy-makers should notice that this regime, in
spite of being theoretically more efficient, implies additional expenses
in gathering, processing and updating information on the tax systems in
force in the investors' home countries. Moreover, imposition of the high
tax that may result from such a case-by-case approach would probably
generate a serious risk of dealing with transfer-pricing practices. The
fact that FIZs typically are duty-free areas, where low, if any, taxes
apply and where foreign exchange restrictions are not in force, virtually
preserves zone operations from transfer pricing practices.
A valuable system that all third world countries should explore
when dealing with the problem of double taxation is that of tax-sparing
conventions. Through these agreements the potential home country
"grants a credit not only for the tax paid but for the tax spared by
incentive legislation in the developing country. ' 122' The system would
allow host nations nominally to establish in the zones the same tax rate
that is in force in the rest of the country. The system grants to the
investor an additional financial incentive for the difference, without
generating extra costs for the developing nation. Tax-sparing treaties
are being strongly promoted by international organizations, but they
are still far from being widely accepted by developed or newly industri-
alized countries.
Finally, another legal mechanism that tax-policy makers in devel-
oping nations might be willing to consider consists in so-called tax-sta-
bility agreements. Through these instruments, host developing countries
may agree with zone investors not to raise the income tax rate and not
12 U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECON. & Soc. AFF., U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAxATION
CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 104, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/102 (1980).
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to create additional taxes for a given period, in exchange for a promise
by the zone company to reach certain economic goals. Examples of po-
tential goals would be to create a certain number of jobs, or to export
goods of a given value. The country's obligation may or may not be
secured by a local or foreign institution, and any dispute could be sub-
mitted in advance to international arbitration under domestic laws.
4.2.4 Technology Policy and Industrial Property Protection
Experience shows that technology transfer is not an issue when
defining zone policies with respect to foreign investors. Reasons include
the fact that most TNCs in the zones are vertically integrated plants
where low-tech assembly operations take place. Moreover, the country's
aim of generating employment through zone manufacturing implies
that labor-intensive technologies would be preferred to capital-intensive
high-tech processes. It would be, of course, extremely difficult to evalu-
ate at this point whether the relatively low interest of developing coun-
tries in encouraging transfer of technology at the zones is counter-pro-
ductive. Evidence seems to support the arguments for paying little
attention to this issue. A further rationale for such a position is that
technology transfer regulations may unnecessarily generate an addi-
tional burden on foreign investors, with no effective benefit for the
country. 2
Those who are still not convinced by these arguments should be
prepared to answer questions on the advisability of compelling investors
to "transfer" standardized and even obsolete technology, such as that in
mature products, and technical knowledge corresponding to particular
stages of production, such as that of vertically integrated industries.
More importantly, one may end up being confronted with questions on
whether policies directed towards technology transfer have succeeded in
the past, and on whether some degree of transfer has spontaneously
occurred in successful zones despite the absence of exacting regulations.
The issue of encouraging the appropriate technology for the zones
is also controversial. Developing countries want to attract new technol-
ogies precisely because the countries know very little about them. Yet
these nations seem in no position to specify what technologies they are
interested in attracting. This problem is aggravated by the fact that
most countries consider technology transfer to be a limited aim, if an
2S One author has argued that "the elimination of restrictions on the transfer and
use of technology is a fundamental prerequisite for the promotion of exports of manu-
factures from developing countries." See Lacarte, Aspects of International Trade and
Assistance Relating to the Expansion of Employment in Developing Countries, in IN-
rERNATIONAL TRADE AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 141 (P. Ghosh ed. 1984).
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aim at all, when establishing FIZs. It has been suggested repeatedly
that labor-intensive technologies usually are more applicable to the
country's goals in establishing an FIZ and guarantee that the investor
gets the full benefit of the zone's relative advantages. Although this is
likely to be the case, it has been pointed out that such technologies need
not be induced by specific policies; zone investors use them anyway
when they are more economical.
A different approach to the question of the appropriate technology
for the zones might be a negative one, namely to define what technolog-
ical processes and what products are not to be allowed in the zones,
according to the country's capabilities and objectives at a given time.
Defining inappropriate technologies seems to be less complicated a task
for policy-makers and a system particularly appealing to the liberal re-
gimes existing in most FIZs.
It has been argued that off-shore manufacturing in developing
countries may be risky for TNCs, specifically in the case of subcon-
tracting, as valuable technology may leak to competitors. Even though
most investments in FIZs are low-tech manufacturing plants, it is not
extraordinary to find zone industries where technical knowledge is spe-
cially important. A similar argument might be made regarding trade-
marks and tradenames, particularly in the case of the garment and soft
drink industries found in several zones. The risk of technology leaking
is heightened by the fact that some host countries do not have industrial
property regulations that adequately protect technical knowledge, in-
ventions, and commercial names.
Zone investors have been concerned about the protection of their
intellectual property rights. Reliability of patent and trademark regula-
tions appears to be a significant consideration in the investment deci-
sion. Developing countries that do not have currently in force an intel-
lectual property system considered acceptable by international
standards may evaluate the advisability of signing the most relevant in-
ternational treaties on the matter,22 notably the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883,225 and to adapt their reg-
ulations to the model trademark and copyright laws proposed by the
224 Raymond Vernon says that the constraints imposed by such conventions by
and large have been of minor significance. The conventions have left enough leeway,
for example, that countries can refuse to issue patents on certain types of products such
as drugs, can fix the life of the patent as they choose, can subject an application to
search or not, can define the terms that represent "abuse" of the patent, and can limit
the rights of the abusive patent-holder. See R. VERNON, supra note 1, at 166.
225 Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat.
1372.
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World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)." 6
4.2.5 Legal Safeguards for Zone Investors
Political instability is commonplace in the third world to the ex-
tent that it seems to be characteristic of developing nations. Govern-
ments interested in attracting foreign capital must recognize such real-
ity and should learn to live with it. Their first realization should be
that although a coherent and predictable legal system is no longer a
sufficient guarantee in itself, it remains a sine qua non for foreigners.
This is particularly true in the case of exceptional investment regimes
such as that of FIZs, where some policies are different from those regu-
lating industries in the rest of the country. Zone policies should be
translated into a systematic and consistent body of unambiguous, pub-
lic, legally noncontentious rules and regulations. Furthermore, enforce-
ment of the investor's rights should be as expeditious and effortless as
possible.
A primary concern of transnational investors is to protect them-
selves against the risk of expropriation. One alternative is a constitu-
tional guarantee against nationalization. Such a provision may allow
certain exceptions related to extraordinary circumstances, provided
there is prompt, adequate and just compensation. The system has been
complemented in some countries with a right to make a claim subse-
quently before an international court. 2
Another type of legal safeguard is that of investment insurances
provided by governmental institutions of developed countries. For in-
stance, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) offers cov-
erage to U.S. investors against losses resulting from currency inconvert-
ibility, expropriation, war, revolution, or insurrection. A previous
agreement with the concerned country is required, according to which
OPIC will compensate the insured investor and will subrogate the com-
22 For a discussion of WIPO's proposed Model Copyright Law, see State De-
partment Copyright Panel Examines WIPO Copyright Law, 37 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 914, at 258-59 (Jan. 19, 1989).
27 This is theoretically the case of the state parties to the 1969 American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, which declares: "No one shall be deprived of his property
except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social inter-
est, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law." American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 21, para. 2, 9 I.L.M. 673. Any person may
file a petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights claiming viola-
tion of such right (article 44), which might submit the case to the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, whose jurisdiction is binding for those countries that have
declared so under Article 62 of the Convention. For an overview of the Inter-American
Human Rights System, see T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON, PROTEcr-
ING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS (1982).
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pany's claim against the country.228 As foreign investors frequently give
importance to the availability of investment insurance, developing coun-
tries that still do not participate in such regimes should carefully evalu-
ate the advisability of adopting such a policy. Countries that are willing
to examine these and other alternatives might be well advised to con-
sider the fact that the degree of political risk exposure of zone investors
tends to be low, particularly in the case of vertically integrated
industries.22
Another major concern of transnational investors is their potential
vulnerability in case of a dispute with the host government that is to be
tried before domestic courts. Arbitration arrangements provide a solu-
tion that several developing nations have found to be the most conven-
ient. Disputes are submitted to privately chosen arbitrators, or to one of
the existing centers for international arbitration, notably the Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).30
Given the flexibility of the ICSID rules-the concerned state must con-
sent to the Centre's jurisdiction after the dispute arises-a considerable
number of developing countries have found it convenient to become
members. This reduces the risk of having the investor's home govern-
ment involved in eventual disputes. All countries having no serious in-
compatibilities with the Centre's rules might be well advised to evaluate
carefully this and other alternatives for establishing reliable methods of
dispute resolution.
Other legal safeguards against political risks, such as tax stability
agreements and industrial property regulations, have been discussed
above and need not be revisited. The challenge for policy makers when
considering these and other mechanisms is to grant investors broad pro-
tection with no detriment to the country's rule of law. The internal
stability of the country and its legal system seem to be the natural
limits.
228 See J. BARTON & B. FISHER, supra note 43, at 915-16.
In a celebrated 1977 article, David Bradley wrote that "among the most pow-
erful deterrents against expropriation is the vertical integration of a multinational in
which the parent company controls either the supply channels or the market outlets of
its subsidiary's products." See Bradley, Managing Against Expropriation, 55 HARV.
Bus. REv. 75, 81 (July-Aug. 1977).
230 The ICSID is an intergovernmental agency created in 1966 by the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, to solve investment disputes when one party is a state. The Centre's awards are
not subject to review by the courts of the contracting state. For an overview of the role
of ICSID in solving investment disputes, see Soley, ICSID Implementation: An Effec-
tive Alternative to International Conflict, 19 INT'L LAW. 521 (1985); and Delaume,
ICSID Arbitration and the Courts, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1983).
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4.2.6 Considerations of Foreign Trade Policy
Some years ago, UNIDO passed a resolution encouraging devel-
oped countries to establish and strengthen policies for the redeployment
of relatively less competitive industries to developing nations.28 1 As has
been discussed throughout this essay, the relQcation of industrial activi-
ties to third world nations in fact occurred, but in a different and per-
haps unforseen way, by phenomena known as off-shore assembling and
vertical integration. A considerable part of such international industries
set up in FIZs. Commentators have insistently argued that both the
concerned developing and developed countries have benefited from such
a partial industrial redeployment. " The former received new invest-
ment flows for export manufacturing, with positive effects in employ-
ment generation and foreign exchange earnings. The latter retained in-
ternational competitiveness in certain industries, lowered prices for
consumers and conserved jobs in high-tech stages of production.
Favorable tariff treatment in industrial countries to products as-
sembled abroad seem to corroborate the above understanding. Develop-
ing countries that established FIZs have substantially benefited from
such a propitious regulatory framework. Exports of manufacturing
products from developing countries, involving both intra-firm and arm's
length trade, have increased considerably in recent years, despite pro-
tectionist pressures in industrial countries.
Relatively prosperous developing nations, notably the newly indus-
trialized countries (NICs), should examine the feasiblity of offering
favorable arrangements to zone products. In fact, an increasing number
of zone industries in less developed countries are subsidiaries of compa-
nies based in the NICs searching for lower costs of production to com-
pete in their home markets or third markets. Developing countries
should realize that, because of their industrial and trade potential, the
NICs could play in the near future a very important role in the devel-
opment of FIZs.238
Occasionally, zone producers have also taken advantage of the
231 See Sauvant, supra note 55, at 127-28.
23 See, e.g., Balassa, Intra-Industry Trade and the Integration of Developing
Countries in the World Economy, in ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTRA-INDUSTRY
TRADE 245 (H. Giersch ed., 1978); Laird, supra note 58; J. GRUNWALD & K.
FLAMM, supra note 101; M. CASSON, supra note 96.
233 Jagdish Bhagwati wrote some years ago that highly successful developing
countries cannot expect to have their markets closed to the manufactured exports of
other nations: "The less developed among the developing countries can properly look
upon the most prosperous as virtually developed countries with identical obligations to
sustain an open trading system." See Bhagwati, Industrial Expansion in Developing
Countries and Implications for Trade Policies, 3 INDUS. & DEv. 45, 46 (1979).
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Generalized System of Preferences currently in force in more than
twenty industrial nations,"3 4 but this trend is still far from being an
institutionalized mechanism. Some developing countries seem to see this
practice as an innocent sin, rather than a valid procedure under the
pertinent arrangements. However, all of these preferential systems al-
low zone products to be included in the countries' quotas, inasmuch as
they typically allow a product to qualify for a given level of local con-
tent and require substantial transformation.2 3 Governments should
carefully evaluate the advisability of filling the unused portions of their
quotas with zone products, even when products have been only par-
tially manufactured in the country. This might give governments an
excellent opportunity to encourage zone manufacturers both to incorpo-
rate more local inputs in their products and to undertake more sophisti-
cated manufacturing in the zones.
Developing nations should not be misled by the extraterritorial
status of FIZs, nor by foreign participation in zone production, to see
in that segment of their economies a sort of separate set of exports.
Zone exports should always be viewed as part of the country's overall
exports. If as a result of the operation of an FIZ the export potential of
the country grows, this factor should be considered when negotiating
increases in the country's quotas of manufactured products.
Dealing with neo-protectionist waves in industrial countries will
require from developing nations a coordinated, or at least consistent,
discourse in the international trade fora, drawing the necessary distinc-
tion between export subsidies and special investment regimes such as
the zones. Developing countries may, in such a campaign, take advan-
tage of the existing literature evidencing the substantial benefits that
both developed and developing economies will get from the new inter-
national division of labor. The rather insignificant impact of zone ex-
ports on the economy of industrial countries should be contrasted with
the importance that such trade may have in the development of the
third world. The future of FIZs in developing nations will depend
heavily upon this understanding.
234 See supra note 201.
23 A U.S. case involving a vertically-integrated electronic industry in Taiwan
constitutes an interesting example. The court did not buy the argument that off-shore
assembling operations are per se excluded from the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), drawing a distinction between mere assembling and substantial transformation.
It held that when a number of employees are needed and have to be technically trained
in numerous skills to convert materials into articles, when substantial transformation
occurs in the beneficiary developing country, and when the minimum local value added
requisite is fulfilled, the product may qualify for the GSP. See Texas Instruments, Inc.
v. United States, 681 F.2d 778, 69 C.C.P.A. 151 (Cust. & Pat. App., 1982).
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4.2.7 Raising Standards to the International Level
At this point, it is quite obvious that the ongoing incentive race
among FIZs is nonsense. First, it is compelling countries with relatively
higher production costs to minimize the zones' potential profitability.
Second, some of these inducements have failed to benefit investors due
to home-countries' tax and anti-dumping policies. Third, there is sub-
stantial evidence that the investment decisions of foreign firms are
based upon more fundamental factors than removable government in-
centives. Finally, FIZs have been proven to enjoy a relative advantage
in attracting export-oriented investments, regardless of additional in-
centives, due to their duty-free regime and comparatively lower produc-
tion costs.
Developing countries seem to be more and more aware of the ab-
surdity of this competition. The challenge for their governments is to
confront the necessity of stopping the investment race without stimulat-
ing massive disaffection among investors. Although some countries en-
joying particularly favorable circumstances have succeeded in increasing
their benefits simply by withdrawing concessions or by enacting more
exacting regulations, this is unlikely to be the case of the majority.
Individual efforts will not stop the race to the bottom. The only
feasible alternative seems to be a collective approach through a coordi-
nated dialogue at the international level. The concerned countries
should meet not only to share experiences on zone problems and poli-
cies, but also to harmonize criteria in regard to incentive measures to be
offered by the zones. An initial step towards this aim was taken in 1978
when the World Export Processing Zones Association (WEPZA) was
established under the patronage of UNIDO, with the aims of promot-
ing and strengthening cooperation between zone authorities.28 The es-
tablishment of the WEPZA was far from successful, in part because of
certain structural deficiencies that caused most coordinating efforts to
be futile. Some of the problems faced by WEPZA included lack of po-
litical power (zone authorities are normally mid-level government enti-
ties) and the inclusion of other institutions with different problems and
objectives, notably Free Ports and Free Trade Zones. 3"
Developing countries would substantially benefit from reaching an
agreement on the incentives to be offered in FIZs. This is not to say
236 See U.N. INDUS. DEv. ORG., STATUTES OF THE WORLD EXPORT PROCESS-
ING ZONES ASSOCIATION, U.N. Doc. ID/WG.266/6 (1978).
2-7 The Statutes of the WEPZA define its members as "all government authorized
areas such as free ports, free trade zones, custom free zones, industrial free zones or
foreign trade or any other type of zones, as the Council may from time to time decide to
include." Id.
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that all countries are in a position to grant the same inducements to
zone investors. In fact, incentive measures should be tailored to the par-
ticular needs and possibilities of an individual nation. The only feasible
agreement would be to establish reasonable limitations to the countries'
autonomy to grant incentives, namely certain minimum standards that
would contribute to the preservation of the institution of FIZs.
A revival of the WEPZA itself would also be of extreme impor-
tance. This would require the countries to make every effort to enroll
all or most FIZs currently in existence. More importantly, this would
demand from the concerned governments a serious commitment to pro-
viding the association with the required political support and resources
to accomplish its aims. The WEPZA may constitute a forum for the
concerned countries to coordinate zone policies and strategies in their
relationships with TNCs and developed countries. It may also function
as a clearinghouse for the exchange of information on recent develop-
ments at the zones, and on enterprises currently operating at FIZs.
Furthermore, the WEPZA might keep the individual zone authorities
updated on new trends in international trade and investment that may
affect the operation of the zones.
Developing countries should also coordinate policies at a regional
level, provided that such coordination does not conflict with interna-
tional strategies. A regional approach to zone policies might contribute
to mitigating or eventually eliminating the existing competition among
FIZs, which is likely to be more intense in a given geographical area.
Similarities among neighboring countries would make the goal of
reaching an agreement on incentive measures more feasible, at least at
the regional level. This would allow the concerned countries to adjust
zone policies to their own comparative advantages, rather than depend-
ing on what potential investors may get at another FIZ.
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Appendix
Free Industrial Zones in Developing Countriesa
Date
Country Zoneb Establishedc
AFRICA
1) Djibouti Djibouti Port 1980
2) Egypt Alexandria 1974
Cairo
Port Said
Ismalia [D]d
Suez
Adabia[D]
Damietta[D]
Marsa Matruh[D]
3) Liberia Monrovia 1975
4) Mauritius Plaine Lauzun 1970
Goodlands
Coromandel
Vacoas-Phoenix
[SZsIe
5) Morocco Tangier [E]f  [n/a]g
6) Senegal Dakar [E] 1976
7) Tunisia Tunis 1972
Southern End Tunis
La Goulette
a Created by the author based on information found in W. DIAMOND & D. DIA-
MOND, TAx-FREE TRADE ZONES IN THE WORLD (MB) (1988), and J. CURRIE, Ex-
PORT PROCESSING ZONES IN THE 1980s: CUSTOMS FREE MANUFACTURING (The
Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No. 190, 1985), and other information
gathered during the course of research for this article.
Refers to the name usually given to the zone and not necessarily to its location.
C Most frequently refers to the date when the first FIZ was legally created in the
coun.
[YjD] means that the zone is presently under development.e [SZsI means that there is a system of sub-zones or bonded manufacturing ware-
houss in the country.
[E] means that the zone is currently under expansion.
g [n/a] means that the information was not available.
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Ariana
Manouba
Bizerte
Tunis-Sud
Beja
Ghannouch
Sfax
Mahdia
Monastir
Sousse
Nabeul
[SZs]
CARIBBEAN ISLANDS
8) Aruba Aruba [El
9) Bahamas Freeport
Grand Bahama [D]
New Providence [D]
10) Bermuda
11) Dominican
Republic
12) Haiti
13) Jamaica
14) Puerto Rico
15) Santa Lucia
Freeport
La Romana
San Cristobal
Santiago
San Pedro de Macoris
Puerto Plato [E]
Barahono [D]
Haina
Parc Industriel
Metropolitain
Kingston
Mayaguez
Cul-de-Sal Bay
Vieux Fort
CENTRAL AMERICA
16) Costa Rica Cartago
Moin [D]
El Roble [D]
Coto Sur [D]
17) El Salvador San Bartolo
Cuscatlan [D]
18) Guatemala Santo Tomas de
Castilla
1975
[n/a]
1968
1969
1974
1976
1962
1979
1981
1974
1972
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19) Honduras
20) Nicaragua
21) Panama
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
Puerto Cortes
San Pedro de Sula
[D]
APEX (Las-
Mercedes)
Coco Solo [D]
France Field
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
22) Bangladesh
23) China
24) Hong Kong
25) India
26) Indonesia
27) Macao
28) Malaysia
Chittagong [E]
Shekou (Shenzen)
Xiamen [D]
Dalian [D]
Canton [D]
Shangai [D]
Tiansin [D]
All the territoryh
Kandla
Santa Cruz
Falta
Kochin
Madras [D]
Noida [D]
Persero P.T.
Batu-Ampar
East-Coast
Sekupang
Sabang [D]
Macau
Penang
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1978
1976
1969
1980
1980
[n/a]
1965
1973
[n/al
1971
h "All the territory" means that the whole country enjoys a status comparable to
that of a Free Industrial Zone.
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29) Pakistan
30) Philippines
31) Singapore
32) South Korea
33) Sri Lanka
34) Taiwan
35) Thailand
36) Western Samoa
Sungei Way
Batu Berandam
Prai
Tanjong Kling
Bayan Lepas
Ulu Klang
Labuan
Pasir Gudang [D]
Panglima Garang
Prai Wharf
Pulun Jerejak
Senai
[SZs]
Karachi
Bataan
Mactan
Baguio City
Cavite
Tabango
Isabela
All the territory
Masan
Iri
Katunayake
Biyagama
Kaohsiung
Nantze
Taichung
Lat Krabang
[SZsI
Samoa
1984
1969
1968
1971
1978
1971
1981
[n/a]
1982
1985
1967
EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
37) Cyprus Larnaca
38) Turkey
39) Yugoslavia
Yumurtalik [D]
Nemrut [D]
Belgrade
Bar
Koper
Novisad
1989]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
LATIN AMERICA
40) Brazil
41) Chile
42) Colombia
43) Mexico
44) Paraguay
45) Uruguay
46) Venezuela
MIDDLE EAST
47) Jordan
48) Lebanon
49) Syria
50) United Arab
Emirates
51) Yemen
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
Manaus
Iquique
Punta Arenas
Barranquilla
Cartagena
Palmaseca
Santa Marta [D]
Cuceta
Buena Ventura
[SZs]
Border Zone
Matamoros
Baja California
Tijuana
Ciudad Juarez
[SZs]
All the territory
Colonia [D]
Nueva Palmira [D]
Guamache [D]
Paraguana [D]
Aqaba Port
Zarqa
Queen Alia
Beirut
Damascus
Adithra
Deraa
Latakia
Tartus
Aleppo
Jebel Ali
Aden
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1968
1975
1971
[n/a]
1976
1974
1973
1971
1976
1980
[n/a]
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